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 ABSTRACT 
Mentalization refers to understanding, labelling and reflecting one’s own and 
others’ mental states, as well as interpreting the behaviors motivated as by underlying 
mental states such as feelings, beliefs, intentions, and desires. Mentalization 
intertwined ability with affect regulation enables children to organize their affects, 
therefore any deficiency may lead to dysregulation. Moreover, initial mentalization 
capacity has been found to predict good outcome as well as mediate the relationship 
between initial functioning and outcome in adult psychotherapy, however, the effect of 
initial mentalization on gains in treatment have not been investigated in psychodynamic 
child psychotherapy. Thus, the aim of the study is to investigate the relationship 
between children’s initial mentalization capacities and gains in affect regulation over 
the course of treatment. It was predicted that children with a more developed capacity 
for explicit mentalization would make higher gains, whereas children with 
mentalization deficits would make less gains in affect regulation over the course of 
treatment. The study sample comprised of 95 children between the ages 3 to 10 who 
were applied to Istanbul Bilgi University Psychological Counseling Center with 
internalizing and externalizing problems. In order to assess the children’s initial 
mentalization capacity the Coding System for Mental State Talk in Narratives (CS-
MST) on children’s Attachment Doll Story Completion Task (ASCT) narratives was 
used. Children’s use of total mental state words (e.g. emotions, cognitions, 
physiological, perception and action-based mental state words) and the use of 
pseudo/inappropriate mental state comments were coded in this study by reliable 
outside raters. In order to analyze affect regulation in psychotherapy, 362 play therapy 
sessions were coded with Children’s Play Therapy Instrument (CPTI). Based on the 
nested structure of data, Multilevel Modeling was used to assess association between 
study variables. Result of this study showed that the total mental state talk, (i.e., explicit 
mentalization capacity) predicted affect regulation positively over the course of 
x 
 
treatment. Contrary to what was expected, the use of pseudo/inappropriate mental state 
comments, which can be interpreted as mentalization deficit, did not predict affect 
regulation over the course of treatment negatively. The findings suggest that initial 
developed mentalization capacity of children is important for therapy prognosis by 
predicting affect regulation over the course of treatment.  
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ÖZET 
Zihinselleştirme, kişinin kendisinin ve diğerlerinin zihinsel durumlarını 
anlama, tanımlama ve yansıtma, aynı zamanda altında yatan duygu, inanç, niyet ve arzu 
gibi zihin durumları tarafından belirlenen davranışları yorumlama anlamına gelir. 
Zihinselleştirme duygu düzenleme ile iç içe bir beceri olarak çocukların duygularını 
organize etmelerini sağlar, bu nedenle de herhangi bir eksiklik duygu düzensizliğine 
yol açabilir. Buna ek olarak, yetişkin psikoterapisinde terapi başlangıcındaki 
zihinselleştirme kapasitesinin iyi bir terapi sonucunu öngördüğü ve baştaki işlevsellik 
ile sonuç arasındaki ilişkiye aracılık ettiği bulunmuştur. Dolayısıyla, çalışmanın amacı 
çocukların başlangıçtaki zihinselleştirme kapasiteleri ile tedavi sürecindeki duygu 
düzenlemeleri arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektir. Tedavi sürecinde daha gelişmiş bir açık 
zihinselleştirme kapasitesi olan çocukların daha yüksek kazançlar elde ederken, 
zihinselleştirme yetersizliği olan çocukların daha az kazanç sağlayacağı tahmin 
edilmiştir. Çalışma örneklemi, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Psikolojik Danışma 
Merkezine içe yönelim ve dışa yönelim davranış problemleri ile başvuran 3 ile 10 yaş 
arasında 95 çocuktan oluşmaktadır. Çocukların başlangıçtaki zihinselleştirme 
kapasitelerini değerlendirmek için, Çocuklarda Güvenli Yer Senaryolarının 
Değerlendirilmesi (ASCT) anlatıları üzerinden Coding System for Mental State Talk 
in Narratives (CS-MST) kullanılmıştır. Çocukların toplam zihinsel durum kelimeleri 
(örneğin duygu, biliş, fizyolojik durum, algı ve eyleme dayalı zihinsel durum 
kelimeleri) kullanımı ve sahte / uygunsuz zihinsel durumu yorumlarının kullanımı bu 
çalışmada güvenilir dış değerlendiriciler tarafından kodlanmıştır. Psikoterapideki 
duygu düzenlemeyi analiz etmek için 362 oyun terapi seansı Children’s Play Therapy 
Instrument (CPTI) ile kodlanmıştır. Verilerin iç içe yapısına dayanarak, çalışma 
değişkenleri arasındaki ilişkiyi değerlendirmek için Çok Düzeyli Modelleme 
kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın sonucu, toplam zihinsel durum konuşmasının (yani, açık 
zihinselleştirme kapasitesi), tedavi süresinceki duygu düzenlemeyi olumlu yönde 
etkilediğini öngördüğünü göstermiştir. Beklenenin aksine, zihinsel yetersizlik olarak 
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yorumlanabilecek sahte / uygunsuz zihinsel durum yorumlarının kullanılması, tedavi 
sürecinde duygu düzenlemeyi olumsuz yönde etkilediğini öngörmemiştir. Bulgular, 
çocukların başlangıçta gelişmiş zihinselleştirme kapasitelerinin, tedavi süresince 
duygu düzenlemeyi etkilediğini öngörerek terapi prognozu için önemli olduğunu 
göstermektedir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mentalization is the ability to understand mental states of the self and the others 
by acknowledging each person has different minds, and to interpret accurately the 
behaviors and interactions with underlying mental states, such as feelings, thoughts, 
and wishes (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, &Target, 2002; Fonagy & Target, 1998). 
Mentalization is a dynamic multidimensional capacity organized around four 
dimensions which are implicit/explicit mentalization, cognitive/affective, self/other, 
internal/external. Maintaining the balance for each dyad of polarities is prominent in 
terms of the quality of mentalization (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). For the development 
of this capacity, the quality of attachment with a sensitive caregiver is crucial 
(Schmeets, 2008). Caregiver's empathic mirroring as a response to the child's primary 
emotional reactions enables a child to distinguish and to be aware of his/her emotional 
states. This mirroring, marking and regulation by the caregiver provides the child with 
finding the representation of himself/herself in the mind of others at first. And it also 
facilitates to get a secondary representation of his/her primary affective experiences 
which resulted in the capacity to regulate himself/ herself. By establishing attachment 
with a caregiver, the child learns to read the mind of others by attributing mental states. 
Understanding others builds the way to the understanding of the self as an intentional 
agent. Therefore, mentalization includes affect regulation and the experience of self-
agency in it (Fonagy et al., 2002; Scheemets, 2008; Fonagy & Target, 1998).  
But the parent is not always able to understand and regulate the emotions of the 
child, which resulted in a deficiency in mentalization. As a result of mentalization 
deficit, emotional and behavioral problems, and finally psychopathology can be 
observed (Fonagy et al., 2002). Externalizing children use distorted mentalization 
which is overly positive attributions to themselves (Sharp, Fonagy, & Goodyer, 2006; 
Sharp, Croudace, & Goodyer, 2007) and overly negative and pseudo/inappropriate 
states to the others (Sharp, 2006; Sharp & Venta, 2012). Internalizing children are 
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hypermentalizers who are attributing possible threat and negative evaluations of social 
events inappropriately (Sharp et al., 2011; Banerjee, 2008). And those children have 
difficulty modulating the occurrence, intensity, and duration of their internal feeling 
states. Children with externalizing problems are high impulsive and under-regulated 
the emotions, children with internalizing problems are low arousal and overregulate 
the emotions (Eisenberg et al., 2001). And those children’s affect dysregulation 
strategies can be observed at their play in detail because play is the main tool to reflect 
themselves (Chazan, 2002).  
In adult psychotherapy, an initial mentalization capacity has been found to 
predict good outcome as well as mediate the relationship between an initial functioning 
and outcome of therapy (Katznelson, 2014; Müller, Kaufhold, Overbeck, & Grabhorn, 
2006; Taubner, Kessler, Buchheim, Kächele, & Staun, 2011), however, the effect of 
initial mentalization capacity on gain in treatment in psychodynamic child 
psychotherapy has not been assessed. In light of this information, the aim of this study 
is to investigate the relationship between children's initial mentalization capacities and 
gains in affect regulation over the course of treatment. In this study, mentalization was 
operationalized as mental state talk which refers to the use of mental state words in 
discourse. In order to analyze children's mental state talk, the Coding System for 
Mental State Talk (CSMST; Bekar, Steele & Steele, 2014) was used. To measure affect 
regulation over the course of treatment, the affective component of the Children's Play 
Therapy Instruments (CPTI; Kernberg, Chazan & Normandin, 1998) was used. 
In the upcoming pages, review of literature begins with multidimensional 
characteristics of mentalization and followed by the development of mentalization in 
children in detail. Later, the relation between mentalization and affect regulation will 
be addressed. In addition to the healthy development of mentalization and affect 
regulation, deficits/problems in both capacities will be reviewed. Along with those, the 
relation between these two abilities in psychotherapy will be mentioned. Lastly, 
assessment of mentalization and affect regulation is presented with the empirical 
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findings in literature. Following this, the current empirical study will be described and 
discussed in detail. 
 
1.1. Mentalization 
 
Mentalization refers to the ability to understand and perceive one's own and 
others' mental states by acknowledging that each person including himself has different 
intentions, feelings, thoughts, beliefs, and wishes (Fonagy et al., 2002). Considering 
others’ mental states as well as one’s own, thus answering the question of differences 
in human behavior is one of the psychological capacities of the human mind. (Fonagy, 
Steele, Steele, Moran & Higgitt, 1991a).  But even if we all born with the ability to 
develop such capacity, the opportunity can only be created in early relationships and 
acquired in the course of development (Fonagy et al., 2002, Schmeets, 2008). 
The main decisive factor during development is the affective relationship with 
the sensitive caregiver, rather than an ordinary relation between the caregiver and the 
child. For the child to develop the ability to mentalize, affective relationship with a 
caregiver who can label his/her own mental states along with the child’s mental states 
is crucial. Exploring the mental states of the sensitive caregiver enables the child to 
develop mentalizing self-organization. (Schmeets, 2008). And through mentalization, 
one can make connections between people’s actions and their underlying intentions 
(Allen, Fonagy & Bateman, 2008). With this association, comprehending other’s 
behaviors as meaningful and predictable makes one’s own experiences meaningful 
(Fonagy et al., 2002) and enables him/her to have a more coherent and integrated 
understanding of the world (Sharp et al., 2009). This, in turn, fosters affect regulation, 
impulse control, and self-monitoring and self-agency (Fonagy & Target, 1998). 
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1.2. Dimensions of Mentalization 
 
While understanding mentalization, it should be noted that the need to use 
different kinds and ranges of mental states alone, is sufficient to show the complexity 
of the concept (Allen et al., 2008).  Mentalization is not a ‘static’, but a ‘dynamic’ 
concept affected by ‘stress and arousal’ in the context of specific attachment 
relationships (Fonagy & Luyten, 2012, p. 19). Also, it is not a unitary, but a 
multidimensional capacity. A broader view of mentalization can be provided by 
organizing the concept around four dimensions, which are cognitive versus affective; 
self-versus other; internal versus external; and implicit versus explicit mentalization 
(Fonagy & Luyten, 2009, Fonagy, Bateman, & Luyten 2012). The balance between 
each dyad of dimensions or polarities is crucial in determining the quality of the 
person’s mentalization capacity. An imbalance in one of the opposing polarities causes 
an impairment at that dimension and consequently, the other end of the polarity 
becomes more dominant  (Fonagy, Bateman & Bateman, 2011). Patients may show 
deficiency in some of the dimensions, and may not show in some (Fonagy & Luyten, 
2009). 
 
1.2.1. Explicit versus Implicit Mentalization 
 
Among the four dimensions, according to Fonagy et al. (2012), the automatic-
implicit versus controlled-explicit dimension is the most essential facet that underlies 
mentalizing. While explicit or controlled mentalization is conscious, reflective and 
verbal; implicit or automatic mentalization is unconscious, unreflective and nonverbal. 
In contrast to implicit mentalization, explicit mentalization requires attention, 
awareness, and effort (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Hence, automatic mentalization 
enables us to know ‘how’, while controlled mentalization enables us to know ‘what’ 
(Allen et al, 2008).  Also, language, as an indicator for explicit mentalization, makes 
the process of explicit mentalization more apparent than the implicit mentalization. But 
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during mentalization, per se, a person is adaptively going back and forth between 
implicit and explicit dimensions (Allen et. al, 2008). This may also be a sign of secure 
attachment and a high level of mentalization (Fonagy et al., 2012).   
Besides, when one mentalizes implicitly, he has a basic awareness which takes 
place in lower-level consciousness. Explicit mentalization, on the other hand, by the 
virtue of having an adaptive function of consciousness, includes higher-order 
consciousness which is in relation with problem-solving abilities (Baars, 1993). Under 
stress, one can continue mentalizing implicitly, while explicit mentalization ability is 
hindered (Lieberman, 2007; Mayes, 2000).  
 
1.2.2. Internal versus External Mentalization 
 
Both internal and external dimensions refer to mental processes: internal 
mentalization focuses on one’s own and another’s inner processes, like thoughts and 
feelings; while external mentalization relies on physical as well as visible features and 
one’s own and other’s observable behaviors (Fonagy et al., 2012). It is important to 
note that, internal-external dimensions are in relation with explicit-implicit dimensions. 
It can be said that internally focused mentalization includes more controlled and 
reflective processes, whereas externally focused mentalization involves more 
automatic and unreflective reactions (Fonagy & Luyten, 2012).  
Also, Fonagy and his colleagues (2012) indicated that during affective 
mirroring process, the infant needs to understand ‘marked' emotion display attributions 
or  the emotions underlying internal states. In order for this to succeed, the infant needs 
to trust external cues coming from the caregiver (such as eye-gaze direction). While 
making these marked emotion mirroring displays, caregiver's face and looks are 
directed towards the infant. Consequently, the infant starts to pay attention to his or her 
own body and face. At this point, the infant's external physical self is as a referent for 
indication of caregiver's cues and so, marked and decoupled affect display referentially 
confirmed. For this process to succeed, the infant has to have the capacity for both 
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externally-focused mentalization in order to develop a response to caregiver's 
emotional expressions and also internally-focused mentalization which enables him to 
acquire caregiver's intentions. This means the infant should be able to use the external 
cues (caregiver's eye-gaze direction) to find out that caregiver has infant's emotional 
expressions in his or her mind (Fonagy et al., 2012).  
 
1.2.3. Affective versus Cognitive Mentalization 
 
In literature, affective and cognitive mentalization has often been researched 
separately. Some of the studies focus on belief states and reasoning in relation to states 
of mind, others focus more on feelings and emotions. However both emotional 
understanding and theory of mind are essential for children's socio-cognitive 
development, this separation should not be emphasized because also genuine 
mentalization is only possible as a result of interaction between these two systems 
(Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). This effective combination is referred to as ‘mentalized 
affectivity’ or ‘feeling of feelings’ (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
 
1.2.4. Self versus Other Mentalization 
                  
 One other dimension of mentalization concerns the objects of mentalization, 
which are the self and the other (Fonagy et al., 2012). It is expected not only to 
distinguish these two objects from each other but also to have a balanced focus between 
the self and the other (Fonagy & Luyten, 2012). Developmentally, understanding the 
self and the other occurs in close attachment to the relation with caregiver, hence, they 
are interconnected. As long as these two capacities are going hand in hand a deficiency 
in mentalizing capacity is not present (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  
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1.3. Development of Mentalization 
 
1.3.1. Attachment and Mentalization 
 
For the development to occur normally, establishment of a primary relationship 
between the child and the caregiver is essential. As Bowbly (1971) asserted in his 
attachment theory, intimate affective bond with significant other is a necessary and 
universal need for all human beings. This early relationship provides the child with 
socio-emotional and cognitive development. Besides, the infant searches for the 
experience of security not only physically but also emotionally as attachment system 
proposes, indicating that the attachment system includes emotion regulation in itself 
(Sroufe, 1996). 
As human beings, we are not born with the ability to regulate our emotions. The 
dyadic regulatory system is obtained with the presence of a caregiver that understands 
an infant's moment-to-moment changing signs. When the child feels under stress, 
he/she seeks his/her caregiver, hoping to be soothed and held. As a result, the infant 
does not feel overwhelmed by his/her affective arousal and recovers. Later, at the end 
of the first year of infant’s life, infant’s behavior depends on the specific expectations 
formed with the help of past experiences with his/her caregiver. These past experiences 
help the child to attain representational system (Fonagy et al., 2002). This is termed as 
‘internal working model' (Bowlby, 1973). In order for the secure attachment bond and 
congruent internal working model to form, the child needs to learn to regulate his/her 
incompatible affects in a relationship with the caregiver by internalizing regulatory 
mechanism (Sroufe, 1996). 
There is a reciprocal relationship between attachment and the child’s 
mentalizing ability.  Both early attachment relationships that underlie the capacity for 
mentalization and caregiver's mentalizing ability enables the child to develop secure 
attachment (Fonagy et al., 1991a). Attachment system is in relation with 
representational mapping and the development of the reflective function of self 
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(Bowlby, 1973). Secure attachment makes the child feel safe about making attributions 
of mental states by providing psychosocial ground for the mind to comprehend (Fonagy 
et al., 2002). When the infant knows that his/her mind is reflected accurately by his/her 
parent's contingent attitude, this makes the infant feel that he/she is recognized and 
understood. Thus, in turn, this secure attachment bond provides a basis for the 
emergence of agentive self as well as the ability to understand other's mental states 
(Fonagy, Steele, Moran, Steele, and Higgit, 1991b). 
Considering child's mentalizing ability, attachment security is not the only 
predictor. The mother's capacity to think about the child's mental states, in other words, 
the mother's own mentalizing ability, is also an important indicator (Fonagy et al., 
2002). The mother's capacity to think about her child's mind has different names in the 
literature, namely maternal mind-mindedness, insightfulness and reflective function. 
All of these concepts are seen as related to both attachment security and the mentalizing 
ability of the child (Sharp et al., 2006). Likewise, mother's developed understanding of 
her own internal states is crucial because this makes her more sensitive and responsive 
to child's messages and she can understand her child's internal states accurately. As a 
result, the child develops self-regulation capacity. In other words, the parental 
mentalizing ability paves the way for attachment security which in turn provides the 
ground for the emergence of mentalizing ability of the child (Gocek, Cohen, & 
Greenabaum, 2008). 
 
1.3.2. Social Bio-Feedback and Representational Loop 
 
As a typical human point of view, from the time of birth, caregiver naturally 
reacts to the infant as if he/she is a human being with intentions behind his/her 
behaviors, long before the infant gains intentionality. Mother does not ignore that the 
infant has his/her own mental states, so his/her behaviors are not seen as a physical 
reaction to the external world only, but rather as an expression of intentionality. With 
this approach, the mother begins to verbalize the infant's behaviors with the intentions 
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that she assumes (Fonagy et al., 2002). And this approach also helps the child to 
understand his/her own inner states by exploring that he/she is seen by the other, and 
has a place in the other’s mind (Target & Fonagy, 1996). As a result of that, the 
representations of the relationship between the self and others start to vary qualitatively 
(Beebe, Lachmann, & Jaffe, 1997), and in time the child creates his/her own internal 
world by using the mental state of the caregiver (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
During the course of development, at the beginning, infant perceives 
himself/herself as a physical agent who can have an effect on the bodies of other people 
via physical contact (Leslie, 1994), then he/she starts to realize his/her social agency 
which can influence behaviors and emotions of others (Neisser, 1988). By going 
through these processes, the infant reaches self-awareness with a contingency detection 
mechanism that provides the child with the consideration of the possible connections 
between his/her actions and external events as stimuli (Watson, 1994). While in the 
beginning, infant looks for the perfect contingency between his/her emotional 
expressions and the facial and/or vocal expressions of caregivers as a response. Later 
he/she starts to seek for high-but-perfect contingent reflections rather than perfect 
contingency (Bahrick & Watson, 1985). Here, in return to the infant's affective display, 
mother's empathic mirroring is decisive. As the affective exchange between parent and 
infant progresses, parent reflexively continues to read the intentions and internal states 
of the infant. Thus, the parent mirrors the infant's mental states. She gives back what 
she is seeing and feeling to the infant (Schmeets, 2008). Accordingly, the child finds 
his/her own image in the mind of the caregiver and then creates a self-structure that is 
necessary to build a sense of self (Fonagy & Target, 1998). This is why Winnicott 
(1967) stated that this mirroring process is "giving back to the baby the baby's own 
self" (p.33). When infant repeatedly experiences such mirroring reactions, he/she can 
begin to differentiate his/her own internal states, make unknown affective experiences 
meaningful and so organize the self around these meaningful internal states. This 
process has been termed as "social bio-feedback" by Gergely and Watson (1996). 
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For this process, Fonagy and his colleagues (2002) used the term 
‘representational loop' formed in the affective communication between the mother and 
the child. A primary affective state of the infant is directed to mother from the infant 
and mother gives it back to the infant in the form of secondary representation of his/her 
primary experience. As a result, the infant develops the sense of self with the help of 
metabolized secondary representation of affective experiences (Scheemets, 2008). 
During the formation of secondary representation, the space created between the 
infant's primary affect and how the mother sees it is termed as ‘transitional space' by 
Winnicott (1971). This space is also necessary for the development of the ability of 
mentalization (Schmeets, 2008). For successful integration and organization of 
affective experience, the child needs to coordinate the representations of both the self 
and the other (Fonagy et al.2002). And for this coordination, the mother also needs to 
create regularity in daily interaction so baby can realize similar primary experiences 
and so representations can be coordinated (Scheemets, 2008). This is called 
representational mapping (Fonagy et al., 2002). It is also crucial for the differentiation 
of what belongs to the infant and what it does not. And the infant must figure out the 
owner of secondary representation before linking this to his/her own internal state 
(Gergely, &Watson, 1996).  At the process of the representational loop, the realization 
of his/her own perception of affective state and comparing it to secondary 
representation taken from the mother develop hand in hand for the infant (Fonagy et 
al., 2002). In this process, the quality of mirroring is decisive. There should be ‘marked 
mirroring’ and “reasonable congruency of mirroring” for differentiation to take place 
(Gergely & Watson, 1996).  
So if everything goes as expected, expressed affect is differentiated from the 
mother with the help of marked mirroring. And if there is high-but-not-perfect 
contingency between the infant's emotion and marked affect-mirroring, expressed 
emotion belongs to the infant. Thus, infant forms a separate representation for marked-
emotion expression of the parent which is connected with his/her primary emotion 
state. And finally, the child internalizes it as it is own. In this way, the infant gets a 
11 
 
secondary representation of his/her primary affective experience. As a result, , the 
infant begins to make accurate emotional attributions and also predicts his/her own 
behavior while in that emotional state (Fonagy et al., 2002, p.192). So the formation of 
second-order representations of affect states provides infant the ground for affect 
regulation and impulse control. In contrast to normal affect-mirroring development, as 
a result of ‘lack of markedness' and ‘lack of congruence', where the ability of affect 
regulation cannot be gained (Fonagy et al., 2002). When the mother's mirroring is 
incongruent, infant's mental states and mother's reflection of them matches 
inaccurately, thus, the internal states of the child cannot be labeled properly so they 
remain confusing and hard to regulate for the infant (Fonagy et al., 2002). And when 
the difference between the child's own primary experience and the second 
representation given by mother is immense, the child develops ‘false self' (Winnicott, 
1965). On the other hand, the mother needs to show that "her display is not for real: it 
is not an indication of how the parent herself feels" about the child's mental state 
(Fonagy et al., 2002, p. 9). But when there is a lack of markedness, mother's display of 
infant's affective experience is seen as mother's own feeling by the infant. Thus, the 
infant thinks of his/her affective experience as universal and threatening. Then again, 
when there is too much similarity between infant's primary and secondary affective 
experience, internal and external reality becomes the same, and the self and the other 
cannot be differentiated by the child. This prevents the child from regulating and 
containing his/her affects and gives the child an overwhelming experience (Fonagy et 
al., 2002). 
 
1.3.3. Stages of Mentalization 
 
Fonagy and his colleagues (2002) asserted that ‘self as agent' develops through 
several stages during the first five years of development. These are named as physical, 
social, teleological, intentional and representational. Newborns cannot distinguish 
whether the stimuli belong to him or to the environment (Freud, 1911; Piaget, 1936). 
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However, for the development of physical agency, a differentiation is necessary. In the 
beginning, it is his/her body that allows the child to reach knowledge.  As the child 
starts to experience the sensory world around him/her with the help of interaction 
between his/her body and the surrounding environment, differentiating what is self or 
not-self becomes gradually easier. So, this initial physical experience creates the basis 
of self (Scheemets, 2008, Fonagy et. al, 2002). During the first six months, seeing the 
self as a physical agent provides babies with the understanding of the fact that not only 
they can initiate the actions but also they can create changes in the environment with 
their actions (Fonagy et al., 2002). These interactions with the environment through 
actions are taking place with the mediation of the caregiver from birth. Infants 
gradually acquire the knowledge that they have an effect on the behaviors or emotions 
of caregiver with their actions (Schmeets, 2008). The awareness of this causal 
relationship between infant's actions and reactions of caregiver brings the baby to see 
the self as a social agent (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
In the first months, seeking interaction with the caregiver is fundamental for the 
baby. Facial expressions of the baby or the caregiver shape the facial expressions of 
the other (Beebe et al., 1997).  A few months later, taking previously acquired 
information into account, infants give reactions to the facial expressions of his/her 
caregiver. As a result, infants begin to have expectations about the reactions of the 
caregiver. These expectations enable the infant to predict the behaviors of the other 
(Fonagy et al., 2002). When the child starts deducing about intentions of others through 
observable consequences, this brings the child to teleological position (Fonagy et al., 
2002; Fonagy & Target, 1997).  As Gergely and Csibra (1997) stated, this stage starts 
in the second half of the first year. In the teleological position, infant's reactions are 
based on the stimuli which are visible, audible and/or tangible so inference about the 
intentions of others are based on physical environment, and not on internal states. The 
only source of knowledge for the infant when inferring the intentions of others is what 
is apparent physically. Accordingly, the infant’s approach to the living and non-living 
objects are the same (Scheemets, 2008). Besides, a pre-symbolic way of teleological 
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thinking prevents the infant from forming alternative assumptions about experienced 
consequence as a result of observed behavior because what is seen is the only important 
indicator (Gergely & Csibra, 1997). 
Around the second year of life, seeing the self as an intentional agency, children 
start to understand that actions are incited by basic mental states which are desires, 
emotions and perceptions and these mental states are connected both to themselves and 
to others (Wellman, & Phillips, 2000). Additionally, they begin to realize actions lead 
to changes not only in the body but also in the mind, in other words, both physical and 
mental changes occur. A change in the other person's focus of attention as a result of 
the child's pointing to an object can be an example of this situation (Scheemets, 2008). 
The quality of the primary relationship between the child and his/her caregiver provides 
the infant with the movement from the teleological position to the intentional position. 
The preferences of others and child’s own are not seen as if they are the same anymore. 
In the intentional position, intentions of other person are decisive rather than the 
observable, physical actions. And as a consequence of accepting the presence of other's 
intentions behind physical acts, child comes to the stage of being aware of mental states 
in others for the first time. This is the beginning of the mentalizing ability (Fonagy, 
Gergely, et al., 2002). 
Around the age of 3 or 4, beginning to see the possible mental causality, enables 
the child to move from physical thinking to abstract thinking. Consequently, children 
gain the representational point of view which internal intentional mental states have 
representational nature. During the development of self, with progressive acquisition 
of awareness of mental states, child reaches the representational self. Children have the 
need to develop concepts that correspond to actual experiences (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
The concept of mental state is more comprehensive than the actual experience because 
it consists of different dimensions like physiological, cognitive, and behavioral. For 
instance, while the actual experience of happiness is primary representation, the 
concept of happiness is a secondary representation (Scheemets, 2008). In interaction, 
the primary experience of immature affect is seen by the caregiver and then given back 
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to the child as the representation of primary affect. This perceived and accurately 
marked experience enables the child to gain secondary representation. This creates the 
mental space in which the child can think and feel about primary affect (Fonagy et al., 
2002). This representational capacity enables the child to communicate via intentions, 
feelings, and thoughts behind his/her actions (Tessier, Normandin, Ersink & Fonagy, 
2016). Thus, the child can experience the events as lived personally, as his/her own and 
creates his/her own self-memory (Perner, 2000). And later around the age of 4 or 5, 
children acknowledge self as ‘autobiographical self' by integrating self-memory to a 
coherent causal-temporal organization (Fonagy et al., 2002).  
 
1.3.4. Subjectivity before Mentalization 
 
‘Experiencing a thought as only thought is a development achievement' 
(Bateman, & Fonagy, 2004, p.68). Fonagy and Target (1996) established a model on 
the development of thought. In normal development of mentalization, it is expected 
that children aged two to five years, come to the mode of mentalizing by integrating 
two separate modes of experience which are psychic equivalence and pretend mode 
(Fonagy, &Target, 2006).  
In psychic equivalence mode, infants see the internal world as an equation to 
the external world. Internal reality and external reality cannot be distinguished 
(Scheemets 2008). What exists in the infant's mind should exist at the outside world 
and vice versa. At this stage, there are no alternative ways to think about the outside 
world, because what is seen as external is also seen as internal (Bateman, & Fonagy, 
2004). Besides, this mode can cause the infant to experience high levels of stress 
because every infant's projection of his/her fantasies to the outside world can be 
experienced and felt potentially real. Therefore, it can be a terrifying experience for the 
infant (Fonagy & Target, 1997). The psychic equivalence mode is also called as actual 
or equation mode, and is inevitably experienced by all children, since young children 
of age 2 to 3 are unable to differentiate the mental experiences they have and also are 
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unable to acknowledge the brain or the mind as the source of these mental experiences 
(Allen & Fonagy, 2006). At this stage, internal and external realities merge, and affect 
regulation becomes more difficult due to the limited and inflexible ability to give 
meaning to events (Csibra & Gergely, 1998). 
Psychic equivalence is only one of the modes of interpreting external situations 
(Fonagy & Target, 1996). The acquisition of pretend mode of experiencing psychic 
reality is necessary for the children to decouple the internal world from physical reality 
(Fonagy et al., 2002). But at this stage, the distinction between internal and external is 
overly exaggerated by the child. (Fonagy, 1995). It is thought that internal states do not 
have any inferences for outside reality, and internal and external have no connection 
between them (Fonagy & Target, 1998). 
 Children provided with ‘repeated experience of affect-regulative mirroring’ by 
their parents acquire this decoupling more easily (Fonagy et al., 2002, p. 9), whereas 
children whose parents have difficulty in their own emotion regulation process are 
displayed unmarked affect expression, because those parents feel overwhelmed about 
the negative emotions of their children. This leads to the interruption in comprehending 
the differences between representational and actual mental states, and prevents children 
from developing affect regulation (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
Psychic equivalence is ‘too real’, whereas pretend mode is ‘too unreal', so 
neither of them can create internal experiences alone (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, p.70). 
Therefore, an integrative mode is necessary for children to have a fully developed 
internal world. And they can reach this stage by recognizing the relationship between 
pretend and reality (Scheemets, 2008). In the course of normal development, around 
fourth and fifth years, the integration of psychic equivalence and pretend mode bring 
the child to the stage of mentalization, or reflective mode, in which mental states are 
comprehended as representations (Fonagy & Target, 1998). This integration enables 
the child to understand that internal and external reality are neither equated with nor 
dissociated from each other but are linked (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gopnik 1993). 
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Parents can use play setting as a frame for their children to create a fully 
integrated mode (Fonagy and Target, 1996, p.221). This happens through what 
Winnicott (1965) stated as a bridge between play and reality - ‘transitional space'. 
Transitional space enables children to make a connection between internal and external 
reality through their parents. The creating of this bridge between internal and external 
takes shape with the parent's usage of language and symbols (Winnicott, 1953). When 
the parent playfully comes into child's imaginative world in a secure play setting, the 
child sees his/her parent's ‘as if' attitude about his/her intentional state with the help of 
symbolized his/her self-states by his/her parent (Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy, 
& Locker, 2005). While playing with his/her parent, the child can project his/her 
fantasies in the mind of the other, re-introject them, and use them again as 
representations of his own mental states. Thus, this accurate realization of mental states 
through parent's mind protects the child from feeling overwhelmed by its realness and 
provides him/her with alternative ways which are not presentt in his/her mind. (Fonagy 
et al, 2002). As a result, the child can reach a higher level of intersubjectivity with 
deeper experiences with others that makes life more emotionally meaningful and 
controllable. However, unsuccessful integration leads to an emotionally meaningless 
life (Fonagy et al., 2002, p.265). 
 
1.4. Mentalization and Affect Regulation 
 
Affect regulation is closely intertwined with mentalization because both of their 
effect on the unfolding of sense of self are crucial. (Fonagy et al, 2002). With the help 
of affect mirroring of sensitive caregiver who reflexively reads internal states of the 
child and gives it back to the child by metabolizing, child finds his/her own image in 
the mind of the caregiver. As a result of repeatedly mirroring reactions which are high-
but-not-perfect contingent and marked, child starts to differentiate his/her own internal 
feeling states from caregiver’s and internalizes them as his/her own. Child gets a 
secondary representation of his/her primary affective experience, learns mentalizing 
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his/her emotions, and finally come up with affect regulation and impulse control 
capacity by making unknown and meaningless affective experiences meaningful 
(Fonagy et al., 2002; Scheemets, 2008; Fonagy & Target, 1998). Therefore, not only 
affect regulation is preliminary to the capacity of mentalization, but also mentalization 
is necessary for affect regulation (Fonagy, 2006). People who have mentalizing ability 
are better at labeling, expressing and modulating their own emotions and also at 
realizing and understanding other’s emotions (Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, & 
D'Esposito, 2008). Understanding and evaluating their own minds helps people to 
experience different kinds of emotions and to tolerate negative feelings such as anger, 
sadness and anxiety (Leary, 2007a). As a result, higher an individual’s capacity of 
mentalization, easier the control of mental processes for that individual, and higher 
emotional and behavioral regulation is enabled for him/her (Sharp, 2006). 
While talking about the relationship between mentalization and affect 
regulation in children, it is necessary to give attention to the ‘play’ because with the 
help of play child develop, create and organize his/her own internal world (Chazan, 
2002). Fonagy and Target (1997) proposed that children’s pretend play is most fertile 
space for the development of mentalization skill in children. Child creates the 
representations of his/her own real-life experiences or an imaginary world in play. This 
‘as if' attitude served by play, leads to an exploration of various types of mental states, 
feelings and safe space for the child to discover the symbolic quality of stressful 
emotions through representations (Fonagy & Target, 1998). During play, the 
representations of thoughts and feelings enable the child to realize that they can be 
changed and/or even distorted, and finally, a child can try out different coping 
strategies.  A child can change and can be more flexible in acquiring thoughts and 
behaviors (Fonagy & Target, 1996). Because the child can take representational 
distance from his/her own experiences, he/she can discover new strategies for emotion 
regulation in the face of negative emotions (Chazan, 2002).  
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1.5. The Deficit in Mentalization and Affect Regulation 
 
When the parent is not able to understand and regulate emotions of his/her child 
and feels overwhelmed by his/her child, the mentalizing deficiency arises. Because of 
the lack of accurate and contingent parental mirroring and presence of an insecure 
attachment, the child tries to develop his/her own mentalizing capacity by his/her own 
effort, but this leads to difficulty in mentalizing, emotional and behavioral problems, 
and finally psychopathology (Fonagy et. al., 2002).  
 
1.5.1. Mentalization Deficit in Childhood  
 
Mentalization deficit can take place in different forms; like one can fail to 
mentalize, one can mentalize too much, one can mentalize in a distorted way or one 
can misuse mentalization (Allen et al., 2008). When the parent is not able to understand 
and regulate emotions of his/her child by feeling overwhelmed by his/her child, the 
deficiency arises (Fonagy et al., 2002). While mentalization is related to impulse 
control, attention regulation and self-monitoring in children (Fonagy & Target 1998), 
it is not surprising to find a relationship between behavioral problems and a deficit in 
mentalization skills. Even though there is not a direct relation between mentalization 
and behavior problems, internalizing and externalizing behavior problems can suggest 
a possible link (Sharp & Venta, 2012). Children who use more mental state words (e.g. 
emotion and cognition words) in the story has less behavioral problems (Bekar, 2014). 
Similarly, in the research which examined the relation between behavioral problems 
and the mentalizing ability of children, it was found that children with higher 
mentalizing capacity show less internalizing and externalizing problems and more 
socially competence characteristics (Ostler, Bahar, Jessee, 2010). Additionally, prior 
studies have shown that children with behavioral problems suffer from an inability to 
accurately label mental states, and use fewer mental state words, especially words 
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regarding emotions (Cook, Greenberg, and Kusche 1994; Rumpf, Kamp-Becker, and 
Kauschke, 2012). 
Externalizing behavior problems consist of various disruptive, aggressive, 
hyperactive and antisocial behaviors (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001). These children 
have difficulty in interpersonal relations which include both with peers (Vitaro, 
Tremblay, and Bykowski, 2001) and with parents (Greenberg, Speltz, DeKlyen, and 
Endriga, 1991). Children with conduct and antisocial behavioral problems have 
difficulty mostly in affective component of mentalization (Sharp et al., 2006). For 
example, children with externalizing problems cannot give appropriate examples about 
their own emotional experiences (Cook, Greenberg & Kusche, 1994). They also have 
a deficiency empathizing with others, and especially have difficulty in feelings that 
involve sadness and fear (Blair, 2003). Seven to 11-year-old children with externalizing 
problems fail to read emotions of others from their eyes (Child's Eye Task: Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), so it can be said that they are 
impaired in emotional understanding (Sharp & Fonagy, 2008). Besides, as opposed to 
affective domain, these children do not have any difficulty at cognitive domain of 
mentalization, on the contrary, they perform successfully on the cognitive domain. But 
even if children with psychopathic tendencies are not cognitively impaired, they have 
cognitive distortions: negative distortions are directed to the other, while positive ones 
are directed to self (Sharp, 2006). It was demonstrated in the similar studies that 
children with externalizing behavior problems use distorted mentalizing which is 
overly positive attribution about other’s thought in relation to the self rather than overly 
negative or neutral attribution (Sharp et al., 2006, Sharp et al., 2007). This kind of 
biased interpretation of others' minds (Sharp et al., 2007) and/or misreading the mind 
of others leads these children to use distorted mentalizing practices (Allen, 2006). 
Those children’s mentalizing includes the characteristic of self-serving bias which 
prevents them from negative feedbacks from others. But this inflated views of self may 
lead those children to feel threatened as a result of confrontation with a realistic 
feedback, and so they may start acting out (Ha, Sharp, Goodyer, 2011). 
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The studies on cognitive information processing can support and give 
information about distorted mentalization. For instance, according to social cognitive 
theories, Dodge (1993) proposed a social information processing model of aggression. 
Primary-school-aged aggressive children have selective attention about hostile cues in 
ambiguous situations and so they behave aggressively. So when interpreting the 
purpose of the others' behavior they tend to have a hostile-attribution bias which is 
referred to as understanding cues as threatening, not benign (Dodge, 1981). They act 
aggressively to others because they expect aggression from outside (Sharp & Venta, 
2012). In the study done by Happe and Frith (1996) it was found that children with 
conduct disorder successfully passed theory of mind tasks, however, they did not 
achieve social insight. They have intact mentalization capacity but they understand 
mental states differently. They have "intact but skewed theory of mind" or in other 
words "theory of nasty minds" (Happe & Frith, 1996, p. 395). Therefore, they can read 
minds, but in an inaccurate way (Sharp, 2006). They tend to attribute negative 
intentions to others and also they use the knowledge of others' minds’ internal states to 
manipulate others. Especially, their mentalizing ability clearly arises in case of lying, 
cheating and blaming others which are necessary to manipulate people (Happe & Frith, 
1996). Sutton, Reeves, and Keogh (2000) looked at the relation between disruptive 
behavior, avoidance of responsibility and theory of mind with the sample of middle-
school-age children. A relation between theory of mind and disruptive behaviors was 
not found, but a relation between denial of responsibility and lack of remorse was 
found. This shows us that these children are comparably capable of mentalizing and 
understanding emotions in the eyes when they do something wrong (Sutton et al, 2000). 
This result does not fall far from the notion of Happé and Frith (1996) ‘theory of nasty 
mind'. Ha and colleagues (2011) used trust game to assess mentalizing capacity. During 
the game, children need to predict the intentions of other player and play the game by 
perceiving the view of other players. Correspondingly, it was found that during play, 
externalizing children tend to attribute negative intentions to other players more (Ha et 
al., 2011). 
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The hostile or negative attribution bias is particularly a characteristic of reactive 
aggressive children. But besides reactive aggression, some children also use proactive 
aggression (Crick & Dodge, 1996). For example, Griffin and Gross (2004) found that 
children who bully peers by using indirect or proactive aggression have an advanced 
mentalization capacity. Although, this capacity does not always mean better social 
functioning in life (Crick & Grotpeter, 1996). In this study, it was found that girls who 
bully their friends have advanced mentalization ability because controlling others and 
manipulation requires mentalizing skill. They victimize their peers by establishing 
intimacy and having disclosure (e.g. giving a secret) in order to be able to control and 
manipulate others (Crick & Grotpeter, 1996).This study is important as an example of 
pseudo-mentalizing in childhood. A certain amount of caution is needed when referring 
to this advancement of the mentalization capacity as mentalizing. As opposed to 
mentalizing goals, this skill is not used to enhance the capacity to form interpersonal 
relations (Sharp, 2006). Pseudo-mentalizing may look like mentalizing, but it lacks the 
main characteristics of genuine mentalization (Allen, et al., 2008) because it depends 
on absolute certainty about mental states of the other by dismissing uncertainty of 
other’s mind. Besides, mental states of others may be recognized when they serve for 
self-interest (Fearon, Target et al., 2006). Luyten and colleagues explained pseudo-
mentalizing as mostly self-serving, improbable, and inaccurate way of thinking. This 
can be intrusive, overactive (hypermentalizing), and destructively inaccurate (Luyten, 
Fonagy, Lowyck, and Vermote, 2012).  
Internalizing behavioral problems are generally related to inner distress, and 
includes anxiety, depression, and withdrawal (Achenbach & McConaughy, 1997). The 
mental state of children with internalizing problems has been mostly explained under 
social cognitive theories related to anxiety. According to self-presentational theory, 
socially anxious individuals have the desire to impress other people but at the same 
time, they generally doubt that they do not have a positive impression on others (Leary, 
2007b). In the study, it was also found that children with social anxiety use more tactics 
to present themselves. They use different self-presentational tactics because they want 
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to make positive impressions on other people (Banerjee & Waitling, 2010). But, they 
are afraid of possible failure and potential criticism coming from others (Epkins, 1996).  
The mentalization capacity of children with internalizing problems has been 
studied especially in the case of anxiety problems (Sharp & Venta, 2012). As a result 
of a combination of cognitive model of anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1997) and social 
information processing model of anxiety (Daleiden & Vasey, 1991), Banerjee (2008) 
explained the problem of mentalization deficiency of anxious children is related to the 
problems on social cognition. In ambiguous situations, children with anxiety problems 
look for threat-related cues and attribute threatening intentions to others. The 
perception of threat leads to physiological hyper-arousal for those children. Anxious 
children are hypervigilant about a possible threat and possible negative evaluations 
from others in social interactions. This hypervigilance has roots in the mentalization 
deficit (Banerjee, 2008). But it cannot be said that there is a total deficit of 
mentalization in anxious children. Those children have a basic understanding of 
mental-states, but they have difficulty in understanding multiple links among feelings, 
intentions, and beliefs which is a high-level mentalizing skill (Banerjee & Henderson, 
2001). In other words, children with anxiety experience confusion when they are trying 
to manage and understand social events with multiple mental states.  
In a recent study, it was found that children with internalizing problems have 
impaired capacity with regard to understanding their own mental states, not the minds 
of others (Bizzi, Ensink, Borelli, Mora, Cavanna, 2018). Thus, even if children with 
internalizing problems may understand the minds of others easily, they fail to 
understand themselves (Bizzi et al., 2018). But those children have poorer social skills 
requiring understanding others' mind because they have fear of the negative social 
evaluation and also excessively focus on the minds of others (Banerjee & Waitling, 
2010). And hypervigilance of those children are even higher in the absence of others' 
minds, which can make them have wrong assumptions by having a biased cognitive 
connection (Banerjee & Waitling, 2010, Banerjee, 2008). In addition to overthinking 
what others think, internalizing individuals also interpret the self in a biased way. In 
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contrast to externalizing children who use self-serving bias, internalizing children have 
self-debasing cognitive distortion which can be defined as the belief the worst will 
happen, taking all responsibility when things go bad, and exclusively focusing on the 
negative aspects of events (Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & Gibbs, 2000; Beck, 
1967).  
Sharp and colleagues (2011) noted that internalizing problems are associated 
with ‘hypermentalization’ which leads to a dysfunction in mentalization by 
overinterpreting the intentions of the others or overattributing the mental states to 
others (Sharp, Pane et al., 2011). In internalizing problems, cognitive distortions, which 
are excessively detailed, generally repetitive and inaccurate explanations about mental 
states of others, are seen as indication of hypermentalization which can be also included 
in pseudo-mentalization because this also lacks the essential feature of genuine 
mentalization (Lemma, Target, and Fonagy, 2010).   
 
1.5.2. Affect Regulation Deficit in Childhood 
 
Even if all children experience negative emotions, they learn to soothe 
themselves first with the help of caregiver, before they soothe themselves alone as a 
self (Eisenberg, Spinrad, and Eggum, 2010). Affect regulation can be defined as ‘the 
process of initiating, avoiding, inhibiting, maintaining, modulating the occurrence, 
form, intensity or duration of internal feeling states, emotion-related physiological 
states, and behaviors as a result of emotions' (Eisenberg and Spinrad, 2004, p. 338). 
While healthy emotional processes provide children with adaptive coping strategies by 
enabling them to have the ability to handle their own feelings (Seja & Russ, 1999), any 
disruption which hinders emotional processes leads to unbalanced styles of expression 
and psychological disturbances and bears the risk of psychopathology in children 
(Cole, Martin, and Dennis, 2004). According to Cole, Michel, and Teti (1994), well-
regulated individuals are neither overly controlled nor under-controlled. Because while 
well-regulation is adaptive and flexible, under or over regulation of behaviors and 
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emotions is maladaptive because it may not flexible (Eiesenberg, et al., 2001).  
Negative emotionality, impulsivity and low level of emotion regulation are related to 
behavioral problems in children (Eisenberg et al., 2010). While both internalizing and 
externalizing behavior problems are related to affect dysregulation (Eisenberg et al., 
2005), children show different strategies. Children with externalizing problems are low 
in effortful control, show high impulsivity, and have uncontrollable behavior and 
affect, whereas children with internalizing problems are low in impulsivity, show 
behavioral inhibition, over-control their emotional reactions, and have rigid in emotion 
regulation strategies (Eisenberg et al., 2010; Eisenberg, et al., 2005). In general, 
externalizing children are called as undercontrolled, internalized children are called as 
overcontrolled (Eisenberg et al, 2001, Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1981).  
Considering play as a way of expressive communication (Chazan, 2002), both 
adaptive affect regulation strategies and also affect dysregulation strategies or 
disorganization of children with behavioral problems can be observed in play (Fonagy 
et al., 2002). Children who have severe emotional difficulties have different and 
various play capacities from each other at the beginning of the therapy (Slade, 1994). 
In adaptive play, wide range of emotions can be regulated, modulated and smoothly 
changed. However, children with internalizing problems generally show limited range 
of affects, lower arousal and low level of enjoyment (e.g. inhibited/conflicted play). 
Children with externalizing problems generally have disruptions in play because of 
overwhelming emotions, show impulsivity and move from affect to affect abruptly 
(e.g. impulsive/polarized play) (Chazan, 2002, Halfon, 2017). But psychodynamic play 
therapy can be effective for development of affect regulation over the course of 
treatment for the children with internalizing and/or externalizing behavior problems 
(Halfon & Bulut, 2017).  
In a single case study with a 5-year-old boy with depression, at the beginning 
of treatment, child showed neutral interest while playing, he expressed few emotions, 
and his transition between affective states was abrupt. But in the middle phase of 
treatment, his interest to play and spectrum of affects increased but his affect regulation 
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was not smooth and transition between affective states was still abrupt. At the end of 
the therapy, he started to enjoy the play very much and expressed many affects during 
play. Regulation and modulation of feelings became more flexible and transition 
became more smooth but sometimes abrupt. But in general, his play's conflicted 
attitude decrease and adaptive features increased during the process (Chazan & Wolf, 
2002). In another study done with three 6-year-old children with separation anxiety, 
change in play profile was supported with the help of psychodynamic play therapy. 
Results showed that decrease in dysfunctional play profiles (Halfon, Çavdar, et al., 
2016). 
 
1.5.3. The Effect of Mentalization on Affect Regulation 
 
 Children who have psychological disturbances can start therapy to 
acknowledge and to regulate themselves better, and psychodynamic therapy is effective 
for those children (Midgley, O’Keeffe, French, & Kennedy, 2017). In psychodynamic 
play therapy, children with behavioral problems, affect dysregulation and 
underdeveloped play capacity find a place to work on these issues with the help of a 
therapist who makes use of mentalization interventions (Verheugt-Pleiter, 2008). The 
outcome of therapy can be shaped and affected by different kinds of characteristics of 
patients. Mentalization is one of the core concepts for therapy (Allen, 2006): it does 
not only give information to a therapist about the person's psychopathological state, but 
also is significant for assessment of the processes and outcomes of psychotherapy. 
Patients with different mentalizing capacities show different patterns during the 
process of psychotherapy. Patients with lower mentalizing capacity have difficulty in 
analyzing problems about him/herself because of the restricted ability to understand 
mental states of the self and the other, and accordingly, they cannot reach to the desired 
level of improvement (Fonagy et al., 2002). Thus, initial mentalization capacity may 
predict or mediate outcome of therapy.  
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In a study done with female patients with eating and/or depressive disorders, 
Müller and colleagues (2006) found that mentalization capacity, measured with RF, at 
the beginning of therapy predicts therapy success, which is operationally defined as 
improved mental functioning at the end of the therapy. Patients with higher RF capacity 
have better improvement within three-months therapy than patients with lower RF 
(Müller, Kaufhold, Overbeck, & Grabhorn, 2006). In contrast, another study done with 
chronically depressed patients, RF was not found to be a significant predictor of 
changes in severe symptoms of depression as a result of long-term psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy. But, RF predicted changes in general mental functioning when 
compared with control group (Taubner, Kessler, Buchheim, Kächele, & Staun, 2011). 
Similarly, in the study of Gullestad and colleagues (2013) the effect of pre-treatment 
mentalization capacity, operationalized as Reflective Functioning, on two different 
treatment models which are hospital day treatment and outpatient individual 
psychotherapy and also on psychological improvement was assessed. The study was 
conducted with patients with borderline and/or avoidant personality disorder. It was 
found that RF does not significantly predicts the outcome in both therapy models. 
However, dividing the data into two groups as low RF and medium-high RF revealed 
that while patients with low RF only show better improvement on psychosocial 
functioning in one therapy model, patients with medium-high RF gain improvement 
equally in both treatment models. This may be due to the fact that the patients with 
higher RF have a better understanding of therapy and they can be more flexible on 
different conditions (Gullestad, Johansen, Høglend, Karterud, & Wilberg, 2013). There 
are also some studies that investigates the initial capacity of ‘conceptual cousins’ of 
mentalization. They may deserve attention because mentalization as an umbrella 
concept includes the other concepts. For example, the higher initial capacity of 
Psychological Mindedness (PM; Appelbaum, 1973), which is characterized as 
understanding meanings and reasons of actions by linking thoughts, feelings and 
behaviors, predicted better therapy outcome (McCallum, Piper, Ogrodniczuk, & Joyce, 
2003). In a study done with patients with several different disorders, Leweke and 
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colleagues (2009) examined the pre-treatment effect of Alexithymia, which is an 
inability to describe emotions appropriately. They found that high initial alexithymia 
is significantly related to poor treatment outcome (Leweke, Bausch, Leichsenring, 
Walter, & Stingl, 2009). And similarly, in the studies on pre-treatment effect of 
alexithymia in group therapy, results showed that difficulty in describing emotions is 
linked with less improvement (Ogrodniczuk, Piper, & Joyce, 2005, 2008, 2010). 
Although there are some studies which support that the initial mentalizing 
capacity may predict treatment outcome, results are not conclusive. It can be due to 
that fact that there are different mechanisms that can be affected by mentalization and 
those mechanisms may have influence on outcome of therapy. For instance, since 
mentalization and affect regulation are strongly related with each other during 
development, this relation may naturally be observed in the process of therapy. There 
are some studies that demonstrate this strong relation between mentalization and affect 
regulation in and during therapy by measuring therapists’, mothers’ or children’s 
mentalizing capacity or practices. 
In a study examined the relation between adherence to mentalization during 
sessions and growth of affect regulation in child psychodynamic therapy, results 
revealed that in high mentalization adherent treatments, affect regulation increased 
towards the end of therapy, but there was no change in affect regulation over time in 
low adherent treatment. This indicated that as adherence to mentalization increases, 
higher levels of affect regulation can be achieved (Halfon & Bulut, 2017). Halfon, 
Yılmaz, and Çavdar (2019) stated that in high mentalization adherent treatments, 
dysphoric affect was related to higher affect regulation, while for low mentalization 
adherent treatments, there was no relation found. Additionally, it was found that 
adherence to mentalization was associated with symptomatic relief at trend level, 
whereas change in affect regulation was significantly linked with improvement in 
global functioning. Study revealed that the usage of expression of dysphoric affects 
only paved the way for affect regulation and thus outcome gain where the context of 
mentalization practices is present (Halfon et al., 2019). Both mother’s and child’s use 
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of mental state talk in mother-child play predicted affect regulation in play. But 
children’s mental state talk predicted affect regulation of children better than the 
mother’s mental state talk, very likely because of the relation between the child’s self-
reflection and his/her regulation process, which provides the child with more insight 
regarding his/her internal states (Dorlach, 2016). Also, in a study that examined the 
relation between the therapists and children’s use of mental state words and affect 
regulation in long-term psychodynamic play psychotherapy conducted with two single 
cases with separation anxiety, it was found that while one of the cases showed 
improvement, the other did not.  Results indicated that the case who showed clinically 
significant improvement over the course of treatment, affect regulation in play was 
predicted by the use of mental state words of both the therapist’s and the child’s. On 
the other hand, the case in which clinically significant improvement was not seen, while 
the use of mental state words of therapist predicted affect regulation at trend level, the 
child’s use of mental state words was not predicted child’s affect regulation at all 
(Halfon, Bekar, and Gürleyen, 2017a).  Additionally, a more detailed examination 
revealed that in the clinically improved case, more mental state words had been used, 
and therefore the case was more advanced in explicit mentalization capacity (Allen et 
al., 2008), than clinically non-improved one. These results show both the importance 
of child’s initial mentalizing capacity and the significant link between mentalization 
and affect regulation. This study presents that the initial mentalizing capacity of 
children can be important for therapy outcome by predicting affect regulation (Halfon 
et al., 2017a). Yet, no study that investigated and demonstrated the prediction of initial 
mentalization capacity of children on the affect regulation of children over the course 
of therapy to date. This study aims to fill this gap.  
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1.6. The Assessment of Mentalization and Affect Regulation  
 
1.6.1. The Assessment of the Child Mentalization  
 
There are many concepts related with mentalization such as reflective function 
(RF), metacognition, theory of mind (ToM), mindfulness, mindreading, social or 
emotional understanding, and perspective taking (Allen, 2003; Choi- Kain & 
Gunderson, 2008). Even though the approaches to measure these ‘conceptual cousins' 
of mentalization can be relevant to assess mentalizing ability, the most relevant concept 
is reflective function (Vrouva, Target & Ensink, 2012). Reflective function is referred 
to as the capacity to think about the mental states of self and others, through creating 
representations that lead to specific behaviors, feelings, and thoughts about the self and 
the others (Fonagy & Target, 1997). As a part of the London Parent-Child Study, data 
on Adult Attachment Interviews (George, Kaplan, and Main, 1985) were collected and 
analyzed (Fonagy et al., 1991b). In a study based on these data, Main (1991) asserted 
that coherence narrative enabled developing ideas on mentalization and reflective 
function as a manifestation of mentalization in speech. So Fonagy and his colleagues 
(1998) developed Reflective Functioning Scale in order to assess mentalization, 
operationalized as reflective functioning capacity of adults based on the AAI. RF is 
thought as a concept related with adult attachment representations and the capacity to 
reflect mental states of their own parents in the context of their early childhood 
experiences. Consequently, narratives told during AAI can be used as indicators for RF 
capacity in this coding system (Fonagy, Target, Steele, and Steele, 1998).  
Development of a measurement system for mentalization is crucial in assessing 
the quality of mentalization-based psychotherapies and in order to clarify the role of 
mentalization during the development of psychopathology (Vrouva et al., 2012). While 
it is important to develop a valid and reliable measure that assesses mentalizing ability, 
it is also a challenging process. Because, it is a multidimensional concept and it 
includes various psychological processes. Also, these processes can be inconsistent 
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across the polarities and are subject to change through emotional arousal as well as 
interpersonal relations. With the help of adults' language ability, the expressions of 
attachment relations and their own narratives about their early childhood could be an 
indicator of mentalizing capacity (Fonagy et al., 1998). However, for child subjects, it 
is more challenging and quite different than the adults because of young children’s 
undeveloped language skills. Therefore, alternative measurement methods other than 
the medium of verbal communication are necessary (Vrouva et al., 2012). 
When the children's capacity of mentalization is taken into consideration, it is 
meaningful to begin with Theory of Mind developed by Premack and Woodruff (1978), 
since the cognitive aspect of mentalization is widely studied and understood in Theory 
of Mind, which can be defined as the ability to understand that others have separate 
minds with different beliefs, ideas, and feelings that influence their behavior (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). ToM mostly focuses on the cognitive perspective taking 
and false belief understanding in pre-school age children (Vrouva et al., 2012). False 
belief refers to mental states in which the child has information about reality but he/she 
realizes that the other person’s knowledge about the same thing is different, and acts 
according to his/her false belief. Therefore, an understanding of false belief is 
developed as a result of the distinction between appearance and reality (Astington, 
Harris & Olson, 1988). This provides us with tools to assess children's knowledge about 
the pretend and psychic equivalence modes, and also children’s mentalizing stance 
(Fonagy& Target, 2000).  
However, the construct of ToM has been criticized due to its underestimation 
of affective and regulatory processes and overemphasizing cognitive dimension 
(Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). Since mentalization ability is beyond certain age 
levels and cognitive tasks (O'Connor & Hirsch, 1999), as a result, affective 
mentalization skills have also been studied. When compared to ToM studies, affective 
mentalization skills studies focused more on personal differences and environmental 
factors (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Rosnay & Harris, 2002). Affective components of 
mentalization skills have been operationalized as affective labeling and affective 
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perspective-taking (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Youngblade & 
Dunn, 1995). In affective labeling tasks, children are presented with drawings of 
different facial expressions, and are asked to identify different emotional states, which 
are sadness, happiness, anger, and fear (Steele, Steele, Croft & Fonagy, 1999; 
Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008). In the affective perspective tasks, several vignettes 
featuring animal protagonists in emotion-evoking scenarios are presented to the child 
and the child is asked to describe how the animal puppet feels in particular situations 
(Denham, 1986). As can be seen in the researches, while affective mentalization skills 
are found to be more related to prosocial behaviors (Denham, 1986), cognitive 
mentalizing abilities are associated with educational level and the status of parents 
(Cutting & Dunn, 1999). Similarly, with the aim of going beyond the cognitive domain, 
Affective Task (AT) is also developed (Fonagy, Target, and Ensink, 2000). AT aims 
to measure children’s affective understanding within a semi-structured interview 
context (Ensink, 2003). 
Children’s mentalization ability, similar to the assessment of adult's 
mentalization, can be assessed in the context of attachment. The Child Reflective 
Functioning Scale (CRFS) was developed to assess reflective functioning of children 
aged between 8 and 11 (Target, Oandasan & Ensink, 2001). Intention behind its 
development is to use with Child Attachment Interview (CAI; Target, Fonagy, 
Shmueli-Goetz, Schneider & Datta, 2000). In a research conducted by Shmueli-Goetz 
and colleagues (2008), it is found that primary-school-age children can meaningfully 
respond to direct questions about themselves, their attachment figures and conflicted 
situations (Shmueli-Goetz, Target, Fonagy, & Datta, 2008). Reflective functioning is 
revealed especially while talking about oneself and one's relations with significant 
others, implying that presenting specific situations enable a person to talk about self, 
interpersonal relations and his/her affective reactions (Fonagy & Target, 2003). 
Besides, most detail on the mentalizing capacity is commonly revealed in difficult 
interpersonal situations, because these revealing memories can be considered as a good 
indicator of child's ‘working knowledge' of mental states and of both intra- and inter-
32 
 
personal thinking (Ensink, 2003).  Thus, CRFS coding system provides us with an 
objective and global assessment tool for assessing children's ability to mentalize 
(Ensink, 2003). However, it is difficult to use CRFS with younger children, due to its 
interview-based nature. 
Additionally, there are different types of research on mental state language that 
assesses children's mentalizing ability. Even though the term ‘mental state talk’ is not 
synonymous with mentalization, using mental state words is an important indicator of 
explicit mentalization ability (Fonagy et al., 1998). Mental state is related to 
development of social understanding. Communication between children and their 
parents about thoughts and feelings enables the theory of mind to develop (Symons, 
2004). And also theory of mind has implications for mental state language and therefore 
it allows for internalization, social competence and acknowledging the self and the 
other in cultural context (Symons, 2004, p.159). Some studies (Meins, 1997, 1999) 
asserted that children internalize representations about self and others through a 
discourse, regarding mental states in relation with others, especially parents. Therefore, 
mentalizing capacity in children is developmentally a result of a mentalistic discourse 
with caregivers (Meins, 1999). Including both affective and cognitive aspect, mental 
state language is correlated with social-emotional understanding and theory of mind 
(Youngblade & Dunn, 1995; Hughes & Dunn, 1998). Harris (1999) proposed that 
mental states regarding emotional states in a coherent discourse, enable children to 
understand emotional states in others. Similarly, Denham, Zoller, and Couchard (1994) 
stated that emotional understanding is developed in the family context in which parents 
explain the emotions and their consequences to their children. It was also found that 
children who use more mental state talk often perform better on false-belief tasks 
(Brown, Donelan‐McCall, and Dunn, 1996). Jenskins and colleagues (2003) found that 
when children exposed to cognitive and feeling state talk in family settings,  their 
mental state talk in cognitive and feeling categories improved later in their lives 
(Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003). Moreover, Youngblade and Dunn 
33 
 
(1995) measured mental state talk by looking at the frequency of talking about feeling 
states and a relation between mental state talk and social and emotional understanding 
was found. Similarly, a longitudinal study revealed that children’s performance on both 
theory of mind and emotion understanding were related to children’s frequency of 
mental state talk with their friends (Hughes & Dunn, 1998). Mental state language in 
relation to cognitive and affective skills provided with a more comprehensive 
understanding of mentalization skills. 
Also, mental state talk is measured along with narrative assessments in order to 
assess the capacity of children's mentalization (Bamberg & Damrad-Frye, 1991; 
Bettmann & Lundahl, 2007; Dyer, Shatz & Wellman, 2000). A common method for 
these kinds of assessments is looking at pictures and creating a story, mainly because 
of its two main advantages. Firstly, in creation of the story while attributing mental 
states to character in the story, the narrator needs to make use of perspective taking. 
Secondly, narrator needs to have another level of perspective taking by paying attention 
to the listener’s mind in his/her mind and assessing what listener knows or does not 
know (Tager- Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995). With its ability to emotionally organize the 
emotionally charged moments, a narrative can also be a facilitator for the child, and 
this coherent meaning making process provides the narrator with emotion regulation. 
Other than affective meaning-making, narration enables the narrator to uncover his/her 
relational themes (Oppenheim, 2006). Bekar, Steele, and Steele (2014) developed the 
Coding System for Mental State Talk (CS-MST) with the aim of assessing mental state 
talks in the parents' and children's narratives. Coding System for Mental State Talk 
(CS-MST) was developed to assess mental state talks in narratives between the parents 
and the children (Bekar, et al., 2014). During the creation of the story, children and 
their parents talk about the mental states of the characters in the book. This coding 
system assesses different dimensions in mental state languages such as emotion words, 
cognition words, perception words, physiological words, and action-based words 
(Bekar et al., 2014). ‘Story-oriented mental state talk' in the original setting is adapted 
to therapy narratives as ‘play-oriented mental state talk', which is based on the mental 
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state utterances of pretend play character (Bekar & Çorapçı, 2016). Thus, the CS-MST 
has recently been used to measure mentalization capacity through Turkish children's 
and their parents' mental state talk in the context of play sessions (Halfon et al., 2017a; 
Halfon, Bekar, Ababay & Dorlach, 2017b) and through narrative-based assessment of 
attachment style (Cantaş, 2018, Coşkun, 2018).  
 
1.6.2. The Assessment of Affect Regulation in Play 
 
There are various methods for assessing affects and affect regulation of children 
in clinical research, including self-report measures. Some common measures of 
emotional experience is Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Lang, 1980), and the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). 
PANAS consists of two clusters composed of a negative and a positive dimension, and 
it is commonly used in clinical settings. Even though this self-report measure has the 
advantage of giving information about child’s perspective on himself/herself, the 
information obtained from this measure is one-sided, and it also cannot be used with 
younger children due to its dependence on verbal evaluations. In order to fill this gap, 
some scales that are based on parent report and that assess emotion regulation have 
been developed. Emotion Regulation Checklist (ERC; Shields & Cicchetti, 1997) 
which evaluates the appropriateness of affective displays, empathy, and emotional self-
awareness, and Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross, 2003) which reports 
two emotion strategies including expressive suppression and reappraisal of aversive 
emotions. These measures are also one-sided, since they are solely reflections of the 
parents’ opinion on their children. 
Aforementioned measures have advantages of giving valid information when 
assessing affective parts and their change, but for child subjects, assessment during 
play can give more comprehensive and wider information because the primary way of 
communicating for children is play (Shirk & Burwell, 2010). Thus, assessment through 
play is especially crucial since it can be applied to children of all ages. There are various 
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types of tools that can be used in order to assess the relation between play and the 
development of cognitive, affective and language ability (Gitlin-Weiner, Sandgrund, 
& Schaefer, 2000). Different coding systems that make use of play have assessed the 
development of cognitive ability (Schaefer, Gitlin, & Sandgrund, 1991), the 
development of mental representational way of thinking (Greenspan & Lieberman, 
1994), and child’s functional level at different areas including communicative, 
cognitive and socio-emotional ability (Lindner, 1990). Affect-Play Scale can also be 
mentioned (Russ, 1987, 1993). APS allows assessment of affect expression and quality 
of fantasy play with the help of standardized play task. While one unit assesses the 
types and frequencies of negative/positive and verbal/nonverbal emotions, the other 
one examines the quality of fantasy play based on organization, elaboration, and 
imagination of play (Russ, 1993). In general, even though it is effective for the 
assessment of children’s development in different domains, information obtained from 
it about the child in psychotherapy process is not comprehensive enough for clinicians 
and researchers.  
Although its importance is emphasized, there are not many measures that assess 
the play activity the child is engaged in during play. Play Therapy Observation 
Instrument (PTOI; Howe & Silvern, 1981), NOVA Assessment of Psychotherapy 
(NAP; Faust & Burns, 1991), Trauma Play Scale (Findling, Bratton, and Henson, 
2006), and Children’s Play Therapy Instrument (CPTI; Kernberg et al., 1998) can be 
given as extensive examples of child psychotherapy assessment tools. PTOI assesses 
the child’s position against distressful events, attitude towards to therapist and the 
quality of child’s play. This scale is important due to its ability to assess the goals and 
process of play therapy (Howe & Silvern, 1981). NOVA Assessment of Psychotherapy 
is used for assessing the interaction between therapist and child by focusing on the 
conversation between them, their exchange of questions, observed positive or negative 
behaviors, interpretations, and responses (Faust& Burns, 1991). The Trauma Play 
Scale includes dimensions like play disruptions, avoidant play behavior, and negative 
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affect. This scale focuses on negative emotions and negative attitude of children during 
play (Findling et al., 2006).  
The Children’s Play Therapy Instrument (CPTI; Kernberg et al., 1998) is 
similar to instruments mentioned above, but it is a more holistic way of assessment 
since it includes almost all of the domains mentioned above, and more. It is more 
comprehensive in categorizing play activity of children in psychodynamic play 
therapy. And it also allows micro analysis of the changes that take place during session 
or therapy. Thus, clinicians and researchers prefer to make use of this instrument in 
order to observe, categorize and demonstrate the child's functionality in play.  
Additionally, since in play the manifested abilities are not only verbalized, but it also 
includes nonverbal aspects (Pellegrini & Smith, 2005), CPTI also enables the clinician 
or the researcher to measure nonverbal aspects during play (Chazan, 2001). Extensive 
analysis of affect component by including affect regulation strategies makes CPTI 
more preferable for the assessment of play over the course of treatment. CPTI measures 
the play activity in a psychodynamic play therapy session (Kernberg et al., 1998). 
Child's play activity is coded under three main dimensions namely descriptive, 
structural and functional. When rating play descriptively; type of play, the child’s 
capacity to initiate and facilitate the play, and the sphere of play are analyzed.  In 
structural analysis of the play, affective components (types of affects and regulation 
strategies), cognitive components (self-other representations, narrative components 
(including the use of language), and developmental components (social way of play) 
are assessed. In Functional Analysis, as a global assessment of whole play activity, 
other previously rated dimensions are taken into account, along with the child's coping 
strategies, and awareness of the sense of self during play. As a result, the child's play 
activity can be assessed under four profiles of play: Adaptive, Inhibited/Conflicted, 
Impulsive/ Aggressive, and Disorganized (Chazan, 2002). In each profile, differences 
in the emotional tone of the play, ranges, and types of affects, regulation, and transitions 
between affects and appropriateness of affect with play can be observed. Thus CPTI 
provides with the understanding of both adaptive and pathological ways of play and 
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various types of play and affective strategies during play. Several studies pointed to the 
effectiveness of using CPTI on children studies (Chazan, 2000, Chazan, 2001, Chazan 
& Wolf, 2002, Halfon et al., 2017a, Halfon et al., 2016, Halfon & Bulut, 2017, Halfon, 
2017b).  
 
1.7. Current Study  
 
 The aim of this study is to observe the relationship between initial mentalization 
capacities of children and affect regulation over the course of treatment with a sample 
of children between ages 3 to 10. In this study, mentalization was operationalized as 
mental state talk. Mentalization refers to understanding internal states of the others and 
the self, and the use of mental state words as a reflection of mentalization. Higher use 
of mental states words indicates higher mentalization capacity, which provides better 
affect regulation. In contrast, mentalization deficiency prevents children from this 
achievement. However, mentalization is a multidimensional concept, and deficiencies 
may occur in different forms. In contrast to early studies, recent studies focus more on 
the interpretive way of children’s perception and understanding about others’ thoughts, 
feelings, and intentions (O’Connor & Hirsch, 1999). With the help of those studies, 
concepts like distortions, misperceptions, inappropriateness, and biases in 
mentalization emerged (e.g. Sharp et al., 2006). In this study, pseudo mentalizing as a 
mentalization deficit was assessed. Therefore, it was hypothesized: (1) initial total 
mental state talks positively predict affect regulation over the course of treatment; (2) 
initial pseudo/inappropriate mental state comments negatively predict affect regulation 
over the course of treatment. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
 
2.1. Data  
The source of data used for this study comes from Istanbul Bilgi University 
Psychotherapy Research Laboratory, established to search psychotherapy processes 
carried out at İstanbul Bilgi University Psychological Counseling Center. This center 
both provides low-cost outpatients with psychodynamic psychotherapy service and 
enables professional training for master’s level students in the Clinical Psychology 
Program. The parents and the children are screened by a licensed clinical psychologist 
in order to decide whether the patients fit the study protocol after referrals which can 
be made by parents themselves or mental health, medical and child welfare 
professionals. Inclusion criteria for the study are children with ages between 4 and 10 
years old, no psychotic symptoms, no significant developmental delays, no significant 
risk of suicide attempts, and no drug abuse. The patients and their parents are informed 
about the research project before the beginning of therapy. If parents accept to attend 
research project, they give a written informed consent for video recording and data 
collection. The research was approved by the Istanbul Bilgi University Ethics 
committee. 
 
2.2. Participants 
 
 Participants were 95 children (60 % male, % 40 female) who were referred to 
the psychological counseling center of Istanbul Bilgi University. Ages of children 
between 3 and 10 (24.2 % were 3-5 years old, 49.5 % were 6-8 years old, and 26.3 % 
were 9-10 years old). Most of the children were in elementary school (76.8%). Other 
participants were going to kindergarten (21.1%) or not going to school (2.1%). 
Children's referral reasons were mostly behavioral problems (43.2%). Other reported 
problems were anxiety (23.2%), school/learning difficulties (17.9%), and somatic 
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complaints (6.3 %). In this data, 362 sessions of 95 clients were used. Number of 
sessions were not the same for every client, but ranged from 1 to 11. More than half of 
clients had 3 sessions (28.4%) and/or 4 sessions (23.2%) (M=3.80; SD= 1.93). 
Information about the patients can be seen in Table 2.1 in detail. 
Some of the patients’ parents were married (84.7 %), others were divorced or 
widowed (12.6 %). Mothers’ age were in between 24 and 53 years old (M=36.43; 
SD=4.74). Fathers’ age were in between 25 and 59 years old (M=39.84; SD= 4.9). Most 
of the mother graduated from university (33.7%) and high school (28.4%). Similarly, 
fathers’ majority were graduated from high school (37.9%) and university (24.3%). 
Most of the fathers had a job (91.6%), but most of the mothers did not (53.7%). Socio-
economic status (SES) of families ranged from low to high. And most of the families 
were middle-SES (42.1%). Information about patients’ parents can be seen in Table 
2.2 in detail. 
 
2.3. Therapists 
 
The therapists were 33 clinicians in Istanbul Bilgi University clinical 
psychology master’s program. 30 therapists were female, the others were male. Their 
ages were in between 23 and 35 years old (M=25; SD= 2.96). Every therapist was well-
educated in the theoretical background and treatment techniques of psychodynamic 
child therapy. They all had the same level of experience (1 to 2 years of supervised 
psychotherapy experience). Therapists treated 4 children on average; range from 1 to 
7. Licensed psychodynamic supervisors with a minimum of 10 years of experience 
provided 4 hours of supervision per week (i.e. 1 hour of individual and 3 hours of group 
supervision) to the therapists. Information about therapists can be seen in Table 2.3 in 
detail. 
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Table 2.1. Demographic Information of the Patients 
 
   Frequency 
(n) 
Percent 
 (%) 
 
Gender 
 
 
Age 
 
 
 
Education 
 
 
 
Application Reason 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Siblings 
 
 
 
 
Number of Sessions 
 
 
Male 
Female 
 
3-5 
6-8 
9-10 
 
Preschool 
Elementary 
Not Attending 
 
Behavioral Problems 
Anxiety Problems 
School/Learning Diff. 
Somatic 
Other 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
 
57 
38 
 
23 
47 
25 
 
20 
73 
2 
 
41 
22 
17 
6 
9 
 
30 
52 
12 
1 
 
7 
14 
27 
22 
12 
5 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
60 
40 
 
24.2 
49.5 
26.3 
 
21.1 
76.8 
2.1 
 
43.2 
23.2 
17.9 
6.3 
9.6 
 
31.6 
54.7 
12.6 
1.1 
 
7.4 
14.7 
28.4 
23.2 
12.6 
5.3 
2.1 
3.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
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Table 2.2. Information about the Parents of Patients 
 
 
   Frequency 
(n) 
Percent 
 (%) 
 
Marital Status 
 
 
 
Mothers’ Age 
 
 
 
Fathers’ Age 
 
 
 
Mothers’ Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fathers’ Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mothers’ Work 
 
 
Fathers’ Work 
 
 
SES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Married 
Divorced/Widowed 
 
 
24-33 
34-43 
44-53 
 
25-35 
36-45 
46-59 
 
Elementary 
Middle School 
High School 
University  
Master/Doctorate 
No Information 
 
Elementary 
Middle School 
High School 
University  
Master/Doctorate 
No Information 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Low 
Low-middle 
Middle 
Middle-high 
High 
 
 
83 
12 
 
 
23 
68 
4 
 
10 
75 
10 
 
18 
11 
27 
32 
3 
4 
 
14 
15 
36 
23 
3  
4 
 
44 
51 
 
87 
8 
 
16 
24 
40 
12 
3 
 
 
87.4 
12.6 
 
 
24.2 
71.5 
4.3 
 
10.5 
74.9 
14.6 
 
18.9 
11.6 
28.4 
33.7 
3.2 
4.3 
 
14.7 
15.8 
37.9 
24.3 
     3.2 
4.3 
 
46.3 
53.7 
 
91.6 
8.4 
 
16.8 
25.3 
42.1 
12.6 
3.2 
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Table 2.3. Information about the Therapists 
 
                                   
2.4. Setting and Treatment 
  
 Patients started therapy with weekly 45-min sessions in the clinical playroom 
which was with a large number of various toys suitable for play therapy with children. 
Each playroom were similar to each other and equipped with video camera and 
microphones for research. Patients have different therapists who were second and/or 
third-year master students in MA in the Clinical Psychology program. Conducted 
treatments were both psychodynamic and child-oriented. Therapists provided a safe 
environment with standard rules in playroom for children by identifying the boundaries 
of the play situation where potentially harmful actions are differentiated from symbolic 
aggression. In general, their interventions were facilitative and supportive by mirroring 
 
 
  Frequency 
(n) 
Percent 
 (%) 
 
Gender 
 
 
 
Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Clients 
 
 
 
 
 
Male 
Female 
 
23 
24 
25 
26 
28 
33 
35 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
 
3 
30 
 
6 
11 
8 
4 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
11 
2 
6 
10 
3 
0 
1 
 
      9.1    
90.9 
 
18.2 
33.3 
24.2 
12.1 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
 
 
33.33 
6.06 
18.18 
30.30 
9.09 
0 
3.03 
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a child's actions, feelings and thoughts. And, the therapist makes the children encourage 
to express their perceptions, feelings, and thoughts. Therapists attend the play as 
attuned according to child’s play profile and made comments by thinking child’s own 
narrative. Therapists made connections between children’s reality and their play and 
so described their emotional experiences to make them meaningful for children.  
 
2.5. Measures  
 
2.5.1. The Coding System for Mental State Talk in Narratives (CS-MST) 
 
Bekar, Steele & Steele (2014) developed The Coding System for Mental State 
Talk in Narratives (CSMST) to assess mentalization capacities via mental state talks in 
narratives of children and parents by including different dimensions. The coding 
system was originally used to assess the narratives created with a wordless picture 
book, called "Frog, Where are You?" (Mayer, 1969), which enables to talk about 
mental states of characters more. For the narrative analysis, the stories told while 
looking at a picture by children and their parents are recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
With the help of manual, while coding, mental state words are identified, and the types 
and directions of mental states are categorized. The coding system includes five major 
mental state language; which are emotions (e.g. happy, worried, scared), cognitions 
(e.g. believe, want think), perceptions (e.g. see, look, watch), physiological states (e.g. 
tired, hurt, sleep), and action-based mental state words which actions imply inherently 
mental states like cognitions, emotions or perceptions (e.g. laugh, hide, cry). Also, 
these categories are coded in three directions in terms of attributions referred to whom. 
Clusters are formed as ‘"story-oriented mental state talk", "self-oriented mental state 
talk", and "other-oriented mental state talk". Besides total word counts in narratives, 
causal connections and diversity of mental state counts are counted. There are three 
more codes that reflect features of mental states. The category of the opacity of mental 
states (e.g.; maybe, perhaps, guess), the category of inappropriate/pseudo mental state 
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comments include inaccurate attributions to the mental states of the listener or story 
character. The category of situational mental state words are the mental states about 
the context or situation (e.g. “This game very surprising”).  
The CS-MST has been used and validated with high-inter rater reliability (.90; 
Bekar, 2014). And Bekar and Çorapçı (2016) adapted this system to Turkish language 
with the narratives of Turkish mothers and their children.  
 
2.5.1.1. Adaptation of the CS-MST for this study 
 
In this study, the CS-MST was coded through narratives of story-stem 
assessment which includes a set of narratives of daily scenarios including a conflict. 
After the beginning of the story told to the child, it is expected from a child to continue 
narrative by showing and telling what happens later. In this study, as a story-stem 
technique Attachment Doll Story Completion Task (ASCT; Bretherton, Ridgeway & 
Cassidy, 1990) was used. It is a structured task that assesses children's attachment-
based internal working models through their narratives. It consists of five story-stems 
which elicit the child's representations of attachment-related topics by using a set of 
dolls and related stuff about narratives. First story-stem named as "spilled juice" which 
while family figures are sitting at the table for dinner child drops the glass and spills 
juice. Second story-stem named as "monster in the bedroom" which the child goes to 
the bedroom to sleep and then scream by saying that there is a monster in the bedroom. 
Third story-stem named as "hurt knee" that when a child is at the park with his/her 
parents he/she falls from a high rock and hurts his/her knee. Fourth story-stem named 
as "departure" which the mother and the father go to a one-week long holiday and the 
child stays with his/her grandmother. Fifth story-stem named as "reunion" that after 
one week the parents return from holiday. 
A group of six master-level students had coding training by Özlem Bekar, 
Ph.D., who is one of the authors of the CS-MST. Özlem Bekar assessed the reliability 
of each rater by comparing their coding about six transcribed narrative with her own 
45 
 
coding. The Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) was calculated to decide the 
agreement level between raters. And ICC ranged between from .87 to .93. 
And for this study, children's mental state words while telling the stories in 
ASCT was used to assess the mentalization capacity of children. Mental state words 
are categorized as emotion, cognition, perception, physiological and action-based 
words like an original coding system. In this study also the adaptation was done by 
Coskun (2018) was used.  The adaptation was to develop the code about organizational 
aspects of mentalization, which was inappropriate/pseudo mental state comments. It 
was developed by accounting low-level RF subtypes which are unintegrated, bizarre or 
inappropriate RF (Fonagy et al., 1998) and clinical judgment of Coşkun with the 
consultation of Özlem Bekar and Sibel Halfon, Ph.D. (Coskun, 2018). Even if there is 
an inaccurate attribution, it can be coded as pseudo/inappropriate only when there is 
mental state word. Physical violence between characters (e.g., hitting, kicking), 
extreme hostility, serious aggression towards others (e.g., killing, assassinating, 
beheading), death as result of attacks (e.g., “killed or eaten by the monster”), feelings 
with bizarre attributions by not comprising an emotional state (e.g., feeling gravestone, 
feeling death), and mental state shutdowns which child finish the story when expected 
to continue the story (e.g., sleeping, dying abruptly) were coded as 
inappropriate/pseudo mental state comments. 
About the category of pseudo/inappropriate mental state comments, Ayşenur 
Coşkun trained a group of five master-level students. Ten verbatim transcribed 
narratives were coded by five research assistants and ICC was ranged .74 to .95. After 
disagreements resolved during meetings, twenty-five of the cases of data coded by 
double-rater. ICC was counted and ranged .83 to .99.  
In this study, total mental state talk and pseudo/inappropriate mental state 
comments were used by taking proportion child’s all mental state words and child’s 
pseudo/inappropriate words to child’s word counts.  
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2.5.2. The Children’s Play Therapy Instruments (CPTI) 
 
The Children's Play Therapy Instrument (CPTI; Kernberg, et al., 1998) is a 
comprehensive instrument to assess different aspects of play activity of children in 
psychodynamic play therapy. The verbatim transcribed session is analyzed with 
different levels. The first level is the segmentation of the activity. In this part, the 
session is categorized as non-play, pre-play, play or interruption. The non-play activity 
includes all activities outside the realm of play such as talking with a therapist. In the 
pre-play activity, child prepares the setting for play such as choosing characters. 
Interruption is only coded when the child leaves the room for any reason. And play 
activity, the child's engagement to play activity with his/her or therapist's initiation. At 
the end of the segmentation, only the longest play segment is coded under three main 
dimensions which are Descriptive, Structural and Functional. For each dimension, 
subscales under them are rated by using 5-point Likert scale in which 5 is Most 
Characteristic, 4 is Considerable Evidence, 3 is Moderate Evidence, 2 is Minimal 
evidence and 1 is No Evidence. 
Descriptive Analysis includes type of Play Activity which includes gross motor 
activity, exploration, manipulation, fantasy, gameplay; Script Description which 
assesses how the play is initiated, facilitated and ended, and Sphere of Play which looks 
the realm of play as autosphere (e.g. child play with his/her body), microsphere (e.g. 
child start the game at one place and continue there), and macrosphere (e.g. a child uses 
different parts of the room while playing) 
Structural Analysis of play includes four components which are Affective 
(overall hedonic tone, spectrum of affects, affect regulation, affect transition, 
appropriateness of affect), Cognitive (the level of role play, stability of representation, 
style of representation), Narrative (e.g., themes of play activity, use of language), and 
Developmental (child’s psychosexual development, social development, age-
appropriate development of play). 
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Functional Analysis assesses the child’s coping strategies and defense 
mechanisms. There are four clusters and examples of defense mechanisms: Adaptive 
(e.g. problem-solving, sublimation, humor), Conflicted (e.g. intellectualization, doing 
and undoing, somatization), Polarized (e.g. splitting, projective identification, 
omnipotent control), Extreme Anxiety, in other words Disorganized, (e.g. fusion, 
autistic encapsulation, freezing). Child’s awareness of him/herself as a player is also 
assessed in this dimension (Chazan, 2002).  
In this study, only Affective Component of the CPTI was used. This component 
includes Overall Hedonic Tone which shows a child's satisfying level about play 
activity. The Spectrum of Affects indicates ranges of affects showed verbally or 
nonverbally during play ranged from 5 (Very wide) to 1 (Constricted). Affect 
Regulation and Modulation reflects the capacity of children to regulate and modulate 
different emotions, and to expresses different intensities of affects with or without 
child’s own control, scored on a range of 5(Very Flexible) to 1 (Very Rigid). Affective 
Transition assesses the style of movement from affect to affect or between affect ranges 
of 5 (Always Smooth) to 1 (Always Abrupt). Appropriateness of the Affective Tone 
which indicatesindicates expressed affects whether appropriate to play content or not. 
In addition, some Affect Types aggressiveness/anger, anxiety/fear, pleasure, and 
sadness/hurt are coded separately by accounting how much intense or not. But for this 
study ‘Affect Modulation Composite’ was created by averaging Regulation, Transition 
and Appropriateness raw scores of the session. This composite scales provided us with 
the overall affective organization of the child and with index measure for regulation. 
In the present study, our Affect Modulation Composite scale showed good internal 
consistency with (ICC) of 0.73. 
In Turkey adaptation, the CPTI was translated and back-translated by Sibel 
Halfon to assess play therapy sessions. Halfon gave 20 hours training to master's level 
research assistants. During training, research assistants coded and rated 10 videos for 
practice until their inter-rater reliability reached an expected value which was an intra-
class correlation (ICC) of 0.70. After they were certified with enough reliability, the 
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data was coded as pairs. Pairs of independent coders reached good to excellent scores 
(0.76-1) in sessions (M=.95; SD= 0.57). In this data 46 % of the data coded double, 
then continued to be coded individually.  
 
2.5.3. Turkish Expressive and Receptive Language Test (TİFALDİ) 
 
Berumant and Güven (2010) developed TİFALDİ to measure the language 
abilities of the Turkish-speaking children the ages between 2 to 12. The test consists of 
two subscales which are receptive and expressive language abilities. Each subscale is 
started with age appropriate item by depending on children's chronological age and 
continue with other items by getting harder. The Receptive Language subscale includes 
104 quartered cards with black-white pictures and each word is coupled with one 
picture inside four ones. The administrator tells the word and asked the child to show 
the picture of the word. Berument and Güven (2010) demonstrated that receptive 
language test has good internal consistency in general (alpha of .99) and across age 
groups (alpha of .88 to .96). It also has a significant relationship with WISC-R verbal 
scale scores (r= .447; p<.001) which shows its validity to measure verbal skills. The 
Expressive Language subscale consists of 80 cards with black-white pictures. The 
cards are shown to the child one by one and expected from child to name of the picture 
on the card. It was reposted by Berument and Güven (2010), that it has adequate 
internal consistency in general (alpha of .98) and across age groups (alpha of .96 to 
.86). In terms of validity, standard scores of the expressive language subtest were 
significantly related with WISC-R verbal scale (r= .521; p<.001). At the end of the 
application of both tests, standardized score (M=100, SD= 15) is calculated for the 
child with the transformation of raw score of the child by depending on chronological 
age. In this study, only the expressive language abilities of participants were controlled 
through standardized scores of the expressive language scale. 
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2.5.4. The Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) 
 
 The Child Behavior Checklist was developed by Achenbach (1991) to assess 
emotional, social and behavioral problems of children. Usually, the checklist is 
completed by parents. There are 112 items about problem behaviors on a 3-point scale 
in which 0 refers to not true, 1 refers to sometimes true, and 2 refers to very true 
(Acenbach, 1991). CBCL is clustered under two main categories as internalizing and 
externalizing behavior problems. Internalizing Behavior Problems include social 
withdrawal, social problems, somatic complaints, and anxiety/depression, and 
Externalizing Behavior Problems include delinquent and aggressive behavior 
problems. And it also presents Total Behavior Problems by including all domains 
(Achenbach, 1991). The severity of the problem is measured as clinical, borderline and 
non-clinical level with the cut-off score of 49. 
CBCL is a highly reliable measure with test-retest reliability with α=.90 for 
Internalizing, α=.94 for Externalizing and α=.97 for Total Problem categories 
(Acenbach & Rescorla, 2001). Erol, Arslan, and Akçakın (1995) adapted the checklist 
to the Turkish context. I was found high test-retest reliability with the alpha of .84 and 
high internal consistency with the alpha of .81 for externalizing scale, .82 for 
internalizing scale and .88 for the total problem scale. In this study, only Total Behavior 
Problems were controlled through a raw score of total problems as pre-treatment 
characteristic. 
 
2.6. Procedure 
 
After decided the patient was suitable for the Bilgi University Psychological 
Counseling Center by a licensed psychologist, parents were given the consent form to 
fill if they accepted their child to be a participant in Psychotherapy Process Research. 
The consent form included consent for the video and audio recording during therapy in 
the case of acceptance of participation of research. Before intake session with a 
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therapist, one of the research assistants who were also students of first, the second and 
third year in master program invited parents and their children for the research 
procedure implementations. The procedure included various emotional and cognitive 
assessments with children and various scales filled by parents. All implementation 
sessions were also videotaped and transcribed. Attachment Doll Story Completion 
Task (ASCT) was one of the emotional assessment tools in this meeting. And in this 
study, CS-MST was coded with the narratives of story-stems of children. 
 After research implementation, treatment started for the child. During therapy, the 
child's sessions were videotaped and verbatim transcribed. For coding, the child's 
session are randomly selected in each child's every 10 sessions (e.g. 1-10, 11-20, etc). 
These selected entire sessions were coded with Child Play Therapy Instrument (CPTI) 
by independent coders. After each session were segmented, longest play segment for 
each session was used according to the CPTI manual. For this study, the child's affect 
regulation strategies in the sessions were assessed with the CPTI's affective 
components.   
In this study, the data consisted of patients from 2016 Fall to 2017 Spring, 2017 
Fall to 2018 Spring and also some patients from 2018 Fall. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 
3.1. Data Analysis 
 
In our data psychotherapy sessions (N = 362) were nested within patients (N = 
95) who were nested within therapists (N =33). Therefore, we used a multilevel 
modeling approach using MLwin Version 3 (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Prosser, 
2014). 
 
3.2. Results 
 
The means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations of the variables are 
presented in Table 3.1 and the results of the full model are portrayed in Table 3.2. When 
looked at descriptive statistics and inter-correlations between measures per sessions, 
the results showed that age was significantly associated with affect regulation. Gender 
was significantly associated with affect regulation, which indicated that boys showed 
significantly higher levels of affect regulation than girls. Pretreatment psychological 
problems had a significantly negative association with affect regulation. Expressive 
language ability of children was significantly associated with affect regulation, 
indicating that children with better language ability had higher affect regulation.  
Besides, while total mental state talk had a significantly positive association with affect 
regulation, pseudo /inappropriate mental state comments had a significantly negative 
association. 
In this data, since multiple clients were treated by the same therapists, it was 
investigated the degree of interdependency due to therapists. It was used two-level 
(sessions nested within patients) and three levels (sessions nested within patients nested 
within therapists) "empty" multilevel models, where Affect Regulation was entered as 
the dependent variable with no predictor variables. The therapist level ICC was 0.01, 
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ns., which showed that therapists accounted for about 0.3 % of the variance in Affect 
Regulation, suggesting that the variance in the session measures is not attributable to 
differences between therapists. In contrast, between patients ICC was 0.29, p< 0.01, 
accounting for 8 % of the variance in Affect Regulation, suggesting that the variance 
in the session measure is attributable differences between patients. Thus, the two-level 
model is appropriate, because not all variance is attributable to session-level variables. 
Therefore, it was used only the two-level model. 
Next, it was run mixed-effects multilevel model with maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimation to analyze the data that nests change in time within the patients. In the 
model, total mental state talk and pseudo/inappropriate mental state comments were 
the predictors and we controlled for gender, age, expressive language ability 
(TİFALDİ), and pre-treatment problem levels (CBCL Total Problems). All variables 
were grand mean centered. In the model, Affect Regulation was the dependent variable, 
while total mental state talk significantly and positively predicted a change in affect 
regulation, pseudo/inappropriate mental state comments did not predict a change in 
affect regulation. Besides, none of the other variables were significant. 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Inter-Correlations Between Measures per Sessions. 
Variables                     M       SD      1           2           3           4          5           6           7      
(1)Age                                 6.85     2.01       - 
(2)Gender                            0.60     0.49    -0.15**    - 
(3)Pretreatment Problems  57.01  25.49    -0.21**   0.04       - 
(4)Language                       60.51  15.33     0.76**  -0.11*  -0.31**    - 
(5)Pseudo Mental State       0.01   0.01      -0.29**  0.40**  0.11*   -0.23**   - 
(6)Total Mental State          0.08   0.03       0.31**  -0.15** -0.22** 0.24** -0.41**   - 
(7)Affect Regulation           3.62   0.52       0.15**  -0.14** -0.11*   0.19** -0.12*   0.24**  -   
Notes. Gender was dummy coded as (0 = female, 1 = male). 
∗∗p < .01. 
∗p < .05.  
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Table 3.2 Summary of Multilevel Model Predicting Affect Regulation by Age, Gender, 
Language, Pretreatment Problems, Mentalization Capacity in Treatment. 
Model: Affect Regulation 
Intercept and Predictors                      β        SE                t-Ratio  
Intercept (β00)                                  3.700                0.057               64.91** 
Age (β01)                    -0.016                0.028   0.57      
Gender (β02)                   -0.129      0.075       1.72 
Pretreatment Problems (β03)                             -0.000                0.001                 0.00 
Language (β04)                          0.006       0.004                 1.5 
Pseudo Mental State Talk (β05)                              -0.973                3.004                0.32 
Total Mental State Talk                                   3.589                 1.229                2.92** 
                         
**p < .01.  
*p < .05. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION  
 
The aim of this study was to see the relationship between initial mentalization 
capacities of children and affect regulation over the course of treatment. On the one 
hand, the use of mental state words was an indication of developed mentalization 
capacity in childhood. On the other hand, the use of pseudo/ inappropriate mental state 
words was an indication of mentalization deficit of children. It was expected that, first 
of all, total mental state words would positively, and pseudo/ inappropriate mental state 
words would negatively predict affect regulation over the course of treatment. Results 
revealed that the type of initial mentalization capacity predicts affect regulation 
differently. Total mental state talk significantly and positively predicted affect 
regulation over the course of treatment even after controlling for children’s pseudo 
word use. However, contrary to what was expected, pseudo/inappropriate mental state 
comments did not significantly predict affect regulation.  In the light of the hypothesis 
and the information given above, the results will be discussed under two titles below 
to show the effect of developed mentalization capacity and/or deficit in mentalization 
on affect regulation.  
 
4.1.1. Developed Mentalization Capacity on Affect Regulation  
 
Even though mental state talk is not the same with mentalization, the definitions 
of mentalization refer to mental states in one way or another (Allen, 2006). Thus, higher 
use of more mental state words can be interpreted as better mentalization capacity in 
children, because, first of all, ascribing mental states or thinking through mental states 
demonstrate that child has a better understanding of the mind of the self and the others, 
and secondly, using mental states in discourse is indispensable for explicit 
mentalization capacity (Fonagy et al., 2002, Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Language is a 
medium of explicit mentalization, so the use of mental state words in speech is an 
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indication of more solid explicit mentalization ability to express and to organize 
internal states and experiences (Allen et al., 2008). With the ability of naming and 
comprehending mental states of self and the others, child can control his/her mental 
processes better and so in turn has higher emotional and behavioral control (Sharp, 
2006). Under these circumstances, it can be said that every single mental state utterance 
is valuable in evaluating the internal world of the children (Allen et al., 2008). By the 
virtue of being verbal, conscious, deliberative and reflective, explicit mentalization 
requires attention, intention, awareness, and effort. Therefore, this capacity provides 
the child with a better ability to solve problems and handle with them (Fonagy & 
Luyten, 2009). Individuals with solid explicit mentalization capacities can represent 
their negative emotions verbally and they can coherently organize themselves by 
achieving adaptive distance from those affective states (Allen et al., 2008; Fonagy & 
Target, 2007). And during therapy, the reflection of the level of explicit mentalization 
can be observed. For example, during therapy, patients with low explicit mentalization 
capacity are easily affected and confused under intense arousal, attachment related 
situations and negative emotions. As a result, it is more difficult for those patients to 
change and progress with the therapy and to change the automatic arousal regarding 
internal states of others (Arntz, Klokman, and Siedwerde, 2005; Arntz, Bernstein, 
Oorschot, Robson, & Schobre, 2006). In contrast, when the patients have solid explicit 
mentalization capacity, talking and naming powerful emotions and playing emotionally 
loaded scenarios are less threatening (Allen et al., 2008). So, child can play with reality 
by transforming, changing and revising the play, which in turn makes him/her know 
the internal and external states of himself/herself better. As a result, child can regulate 
his/her emotions in the play and finally benefit from the therapy (Verheugt-Pleiter, 
2008; Fonagy & Target, 1996). 
In addition, children who have better mentalizing ability are less likely 
experience an activation of their attachment system during interactions with others, as 
they are more likely to interpret and perceive others’ responses as benign, rather than 
threatening. Therefore, a great amount of mental space is created to mentalize and be 
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in-relation with others (George & Solomon, 1996). So, in therapy, a child with a better 
mentalization capacity will find it easier to develop a relation with his/her therapist and 
to play adaptive and regulative play. Higher engagement in pretend play means higher 
use of mental state talk, which in turn supports emotion regulation (Galyer & Evans, 
2001). Besides, when those children are playing, fantasy and reality are not separated 
from each other for them (Fonagy & Target, 1998). By being in mentalizing in mode 
they can experience mental states as representations, thus play can serve as a fertile 
area for the use and understanding of mental states. This ‘as if’ attitude served by play 
characters through representations leads to the exploration of various types of mental 
states (Fonagy & Target, 1998). To facilitate mentalizing, therapist can comment on 
mental content of play characters, child’s behaviors, or play in general. Therapist can 
identify mental states underlying child’s behavior and play, or can verbalize the 
intentions of the play characters, significant others of child, or reflect the uniqueness 
of the child’s mental world (Fonagy, 2000).  For the children with developed 
mentalization capacity, it will be easier to regulate themes, thoughts and emotions 
raised in the play, or to understand the connections created and told by therapist during 
play, or organize his/her own experiences because he/she has an access to a sense of 
self, structured and secured with mental states (Verheugt-Pleiter, 2008). And when the 
child is able to perceive play characters and himself/herself as having an internal world, 
this brings about regulation of affects for the child in play (Target & Fonagy, 1996, 
Fonagy et al., 2002). 
Positive prediction of initial total mental state talk of children on affect 
regulation in play during therapy may reveal that children who start with better 
mentalization capacity gain even higher capacity with the help of therapist. With the 
help of the feelings aroused in the child during the therapy, the child learns to think 
about those feelings, which is essential to control these emotions effectively, to regulate 
the intensity and duration of these emotions, and to learn to express these feelings to 
others and to his/her own self (Allen, Bleiberg, Haslam-Hopwood, 2003). According 
to Fonagy and colleagues, it is called as ‘mentalized affectivity’. It is a term more used 
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for the improved mentalization capacity with the help psychotherapy. Mentalized 
affectivity consists of three elements, which are identifying, modulating, and 
expressing affects. Mentalized affectivity is also in relation with advanced affect 
regulation capacity and therefore provides the subject with the discovery of his/her own 
affect states. It defines how affect regulation is shaped through mentalization (Fonagy 
et al., 2002).  
 
4.1.2. Mentalization Deficit on Affect Regulation 
 
Since the result is against our expectation, it was decided to examine the data 
qualitatively in order to have a better understanding. When the children who had high 
levels pseudo/inappropriate mental state words taken into account, it was revealed that 
they mostly chose gross-motor or game play, most probably in order to protect 
themselves from the dysregulation that may arise from symbolic play. Those children 
keep away from imaginary/symbolic play mostly at the beginning of the therapy and 
prefer other types of plays such as board games, and gross-motor plays like playing 
football. On the first two sessions with children with high levels of pseudo words, 
fantasy play was chosen in 10 sessions (38.55%), while other types of play were 
preferred in 16 sessions (61.45%).  
In our data, two of children (UŞK and MHS) who had high level use of 
pseudo/inappropriate mental state comments preferred game play for every coded 
session. Besides, it was seen that they had average/high level of affect regulation at 
those coded play sessions. This information is vital, because it was known that 
game/structured plays contain children’s uncomfortable feelings and unacceptable 
actions and thoughts (Bellinson, 2013). Structured plays like game play may enable 
children to regulate the level of frustration, anxiety and anger during play (Oren, 2008). 
Thus, it can be easier for children to regulate emotions during structured play, as they 
can predict what will happen during structured board game rather than fantasy play, 
which can be thought as having a connection with the unconsciousness. And in 
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psychodynamic therapy, therapist continues with the material child brings to play 
room, so he/she does not push the child to play another game. Thus, child can maintain 
the regulation phase with structured play (Bellinson, 2000).  
A more detailed investigation of the data revealed that another child with 
similar levels of pseudo MST (MT) started the therapy with gross motor and game 
play, and then moved to the symbolic play, demonstrating average/high level of affect 
regulation for every coded sessions. This indicates that over the course of the therapy, 
children may move from structured play to fantasy play as they acquire functional 
capacities. When the time comes, the child may be ready to regulate emotions raised in 
fantasy play (Vergeut-Pleiter, 2008). Therefore, in this study, we did not observe 
dysregulation in those children’s play due to the way the play was organized as a result 
of play type preference. It may be that the result was not significant since we assessed 
affect regulation within play setting.  
The quality of fantasy play can be another reason why we could not find 
significant effect as a result of analysis of affect regulation in play. In our data, we also 
observed that even though some children with high pseudo/inappropriate level 
preferred fantasy play and show good level of affect regulation. They may stay in 
‘pretend mode’ and used play as a defensive strategy to distance themselves from 
disturbing emotions. Boundary between fantasy and reality can be very distinct for 
them, thus enabling them to protect themselves from threatening and painful mental 
states and to continue to play (Zevalnik, 2008). They can entirely refuse the reflection 
of their internal world on the external world by staying at pretend mode. This type of 
play can be easily confused with healthy play, so the therapist needs to pay close 
attention to pretend mode. Child seems to have developed symbolic play capacity, but 
actually he/she cannot integrate his/her reality to his/her play. Also, during this type of 
plays, child does not let the therapist talk about play situation, about the relation 
between therapist and child, or about the issues outside the therapy. And when therapist 
makes a comment about external reality, they can stop playing because the boundary 
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between fantasy and reality disappeared. Child uses the pretend mode only as a defense 
to prevent himself/herself from affect dysregulation (Verheugt-Pleiter, 2008).  
Below there are two short vignettes from the play segments of two children 
(ESS and MCU) who had high level of pseudo mental state comments. These two 
sessions are from the beginning of therapy for both children. They preferred fantasy 
play and they both showed average/high affect regulation. They played without 
disruption with good level of modulation during play until the therapist made a 
comment that made the child the remember reality,:  
 
ESS 7th Session: 
Ç: soldiers are gathering, now other soldiers are going home (soldiers are 
walking) when they arrived (one screamed) ‘Ah! Everything in my house was 
stolen!’, I will catch them (he runs) then he gave up…Other soldiers also came 
to the base and they did not dead, they are alive. They decide to protect their 
vehicles. They have another ambulance and also a plane…my soldiers are 
ready and we attack on your soldiers, let’s create your base…your team is 
small, our team is big. We are attacking now 
T: We are occupied by your team 
Ç: I will kick these enemies  
T: You get angry and hit the soldiers 
Ç: I hate this soldiers. Let’s tidy up, and play another game  
 
As soon as the therapist made a comment from outside of play about the child’s 
own self, he had difficulty regulating himself but at that time he decided to end the 
play. Due to our coding system, we only coded the longest play segment, and did not 
coded the part after the play is ended. Therefore, in the coded play segment he had 
showed average affect regulation.  
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MCU 11the Session: 
Ç: There is big wave, and monster is coming…route is changing, route is 
changing (he is moving the ship in the sand)…Where is the captain, ‘ah captain 
route has been changed’ 
T: How big is this wave?! 
Ç: Yes, ship is almost broken!...  
T: It is really difficult for the ship 
Ç: Ship is hitting the rock and taking wateeer! 
T: oh it hit the rock! 
Ç: …every where is sand, we should put them to the truck, you will be truck 
T: this truck is totally loaded with sand, pity, truck, how it will move…how much 
sand you loaded to me, how can I move (child empties sand from truck) aa the 
sand is emptied! 
Ç: started again…it is still continuing (child puts sand to truck) 
T: still continue, he does not think about me 
Ç: when the time will finish? 
T: We still have 2 minutes 
Ç: okey, we can tidy up 
 
The situation is also similar in this piece of play segment, when the therapist 
made a comment about play situation connected to the child, he got far away from play 
and asked about the remaining time and then finished the game before time is up.  
As can be seen in the examples, children seemed like controlling their emotions 
in play until a comment came from outside world, pushes the child away from playing; 
which indicates that they may be playing defensively with the help of pretend mode. 
Therefore, this can be the reason why children who use pseudo/inappropriate mental 
state comments did not show affect dysregulation in play.  
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Furthermore, in this study, the data was not divided according to diagnosis 
(internalizing or externalizing), total behavior problems were controlled. This also can 
be another reason why we could not find significant result. In literature, it is known 
that children who make use of inappropriate attributions, which can be called as 
distorted and pseudo mentalizing, are children with externalizing problems (Sharp, 
2006; Sharp et al., 2006; Sharp et al., 2007, Coşkun, 2018). If the effect of 
pseudo/inappropriate mental state comments on affect regulation in externalizing 
children and internalizing children are taken into account separately, the results could 
be supportive of our expectation with externalizing children. 
In addition, mentalization deficiencies can arise especially when the child is 
triggered by attachment related issues and/or when the child faces emotionally 
overwhelmed situations and intense interpersonal relations (Fonagy & Allison, 2012). 
And in this study, initial mentalization capacity was assessed with the instruments 
including stories related to attachment figures. So, a child who has a fragile 
mentalization capacity does not know how to cope with emotionally intense thoughts 
and feelings about attachment figures, results in higher arousal and non-mentalizing 
reactions. Under those circumstances, the child may interpret self’s and others’ minds 
malevolent and using more pseudo/ inappropriate mental state words (Fonagy & 
Allison, 2012). But, after the beginning of the therapy, child can feel secure with 
therapist who provides a safe and calming environment (Winnicott, 1982). And as a 
result of therapist’s mentalizing interventions during therapy, may decrease the child’s 
need to use of pseudo/inappropriate mental state words with the help of increased 
mentalization capacity which increases the ability to regulate emotions (Verheught-
Pleiter, 2008; Chazan, 2002).  
 
4.2. Clinical Implications  
 
Children who need therapy are coming to therapy suffering from behavioral 
problems regardless of the severity and the type of the problems. In any case, children 
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need therapy because of their difficulties in their lives. So, when the therapist deals 
with the problems of a child, protective factors and strengths of the child may be 
unknowingly disregarded. But, therapists can benefit from paying attention to the 
protective factors the child has by not forgetting the problems of the child. A child who 
comes to the therapy with better developed mentalization capacity may counter the 
negative effects of his/her characteristics that would hinder the positive outcome of the 
therapy. Thus, they can develop better affect regulation ability with the facilitative 
impact of developed mentalization capacity, which is referred to as the use of mental 
state words in this study. Thus, mentalization capacity can be assessed as a strength of 
the child in the beginning of and throughout the therapy.  
The development of affect regulation paves the way to the development of 
therapy by providing symptom relief and increase in psychosocial functioning 
(Verheught,-Pleiter, 2008). In this study, positive effect of pretreatment mentalization 
on affect regulation over the course of treatment is able to show us that initial 
mentalization capacity can be thought as an important factor for therapy prognosis by 
means of predicting affect regulation. Thus, therapist can focus more on the child’s 
affect regulation reactions as a result of mentalization interventions rather than 
focusing on symptomatic changes. This holds the potential to make therapy process 
more effective.   
In general, even though therapy is a dynamic process, assessment period before 
commencing therapy is beneficial for the therapist to understand the client better and 
to know which techniques and/or approaches suit the needs of the patients the best 
(Zevalnik, 2008). This study shows the importance of assessing pretreatment 
mentalization capacity of children, so that the therapist can decide the appropriate 
mentalization technique to begin the therapy with. Children who start therapy have 
various mentalization capacities, which is in relation to the nature and severity of the 
problems children have. So throughout the therapy, therapist needs to be constantly 
attuned to child’s level of mental functioning, and has to decide which kind of relation 
to seek, and to create contact in the same level which make child feel seen and 
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understood (Vrouva et al., 2012). For example, if the child has little mentalization 
capacity, therapist first serves the caring environment in order to provide the child with 
the space for the development to take place. To achieve this, therapist should be attuned 
with child’s accurate level. If the child is at equivalence mode therapist should have 
relation through that mode. For example, therapist needs to decide whether the child is 
ready for the therapist’s verbalizations. If the child is not ready and has a little mental 
space, he/she can interpret verbal intervention as an attack to himself/herself 
(Verheugt-Pleiter, 2008). Or if the child has better mentalization capacity, interventions 
can be implied faster and efficiency of therapy increases.  
  
4.3. Limitations and Future Research  
 
This study emphasized the effectiveness of developed mentalization capacity 
on affect regulation with multilevel analysis. During our study, we are faced with 
several limitations. First of all, although sample size in this study can be thought as 
sufficient, it still was relatively small. Larger sample and preferably more time points 
can provide more advanced methodology and would be better for the generalizability 
of the results. Moreover, in order not to conduct the research with insufficient sample 
size, we included patients with different numbers of sessions. Additionally, some 
patients’ therapy sessions were not terminated. Both because the sample size was small 
and the aim of this study was to see the effect of mentalization capacity regardless of 
behavioral problems, internalizing and externalizing behavior problems were not 
investigated separately in the data. Future researches can take this into consideration 
and separate the data, because those children have different mentalization and affect 
regulation strategies.  And also, pre-post symptomatic assessment can be beneficial to 
see the effect of mentalization on symptomatic relief with the mediation of affect 
regulation. 
Naturalistic design of this study, which is conducted with patients in 
psychodynamic therapy, provided us with a direct reflection of clinical work. But the 
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study without control group design limited in its internal validity even if it had high 
external validity. In addition, the effect of mentalization capacity on affect regulation 
in play documented as a strength. Even though we expected to see the influence of 
improvement during therapy to children’s daily lives, it was not possible to tell 
children’s affect regulation capacity outside the therapy setting with the instruments 
we used. Thus, in addition to the change in affect regulation over the course of 
treatment, the change in affect regulation outside of the therapy can be assessed in 
further researches. Because, even if therapists see the changes and/or child feels the 
change in the ability to control his/her feelings, it is important to assess the parents’ 
observations and how they evaluate the change in the process.  
In this study, only pseudo/inappropriate mentalization was assessed as a 
mentalization deficit. This can also be thought as a strength because it reveals clearer 
information. But mentalization is a multidimensional concept and there are various 
kinds of mentalization deficits. The analysis of relation between different mentalization 
deficits and affect regulation can provide wider picture of the effect of mentalization 
failures and enables the development of useful clinical interventions regarding different 
deficits. Another limitation is the assessment of mentalization. Development of pseudo/ 
inappropriate mental state comments’ coding criteria were dependent on low RF 
scoring system (Fonagy et al., 1998). But every single inaccurate comment could not 
be included in this coding system because of the lack of mental state words, and our 
caution to not to break the frame of CS-MST (Bekar et al., 2014). Besides, in literature, 
pseudo mentalization defined as having different characteristics (Sharp & Venta, 2012, 
Allen et al., 2008), but this coding system focuses more on the inappropriate side of 
pseudo mentalization.  Further studies can look at pseudo mentalization with the help 
of a more comprehensive assessment tool to capture other aspects of this mentalization 
deficit, which can provide better results. And in this study, total mental state talk was 
assessed not by separating the types of mental states (e.g. emotion, cognition, 
perception, physiological, action-based) from each other. In future studies, types, 
frequency, variety and causality of mental states can be analyzed. 
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In this study, affect regulation was created by averaging affect regulation, 
transition between affects, and appropriateness of affects. But, coding system is giving 
information about the affect types in the play segment. Affect regulation can change in 
terms of dominant affect experienced in the sessions. Child can have different level of 
affect regulation under anger sadness, or anxiety. Therefore, further research can look 
for the effect of dominant affect in the session.  
Affect regulation during sessions were coded by the observer with CPTI. Even 
if CPTI includes nonverbal characteristics, additional nonverbal assessment tools can 
give more detail information to analyze the sessions.  
In our study, the aim was to see prediction of affect regulation in therapy by 
different initial mentalization capacities. But in future researches the association 
between mentalization capacity and the growth of affect regulation can be assessed 
throughout therapy. In addition to initial mentalization capacity, the relation between 
mentalization adherence during therapy and affect regulation can be assessed. This can 
give detailed information about how mentalization capacity influences affect regulation 
in therapy and the growth of affect regulation over the course of therapy. And in this 
study only initial mentalization capacities were assessed, future research can 
investigate pre-post mentalization capacities and the relation of the change through 
affect regulation. Also, it is important to take into another mechanisms as moderator 
into consideration. These mechanisms can be the attitude and reactions of the 
therapists, the characteristics of the therapists and the relation between child and the 
therapist and etc. When it was looked at the affect regulation during therapy, the effect 
of therapists can be very crucial. The capacity of mentalization had been developed 
with the relation to caregiver. Thus, in therapy, child’s relation with therapist reflects 
the child’s relation with his/her parents and reflects the level of mentalization capacity. 
Further research can look at the therapists’ effect on affect regulation. Because the 
ability of therapist can be mediator between mentalization capacity and the affect 
regulation.  
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4.4. Conclusion  
 
 This study is aimed at investigating the effect of initial mentalization capacity 
on affect regulation in play over the course of treatment. Findings showed that the 
effect of different mentalization capacities, which can be either developed or deficient, 
influence affect regulation over the course of treatment differently. Firstly, the 
prediction of total mental state talks as developed mentalization capacity on affect 
regulation was assessed. Secondly, the prediction of pseudo/inappropriate mental state 
talk as mentalization deficit on affect regulation was investigated.  
 Findings of this study demonstrated that total mental state talk significantly 
predicted affect regulation over the course of treatment positively, while 
pseudo/inappropriate mental state words did not significantly predict affect regulation 
negatively. But we also know that there can be children that use pseudo/inappropriate 
mental state words along with appropriate mental state words. This results led us to see 
the protective effect of developed mentalization capacity of children while gaining 
affect regulation over the course of treatment and to see how important solid 
mentalization capacity is for children.  
It is hoped that this study encourages the therapist to focus on protective factors 
of children, to see the importance of mentalization in therapy prognosis, and to realize 
the importance of assessment period of therapy in general. It is also expected that this 
study directs researchers to assess the effects of different initial mentalization 
capacities over the course of treatment and the relation between mentalization and 
affect regulation on child therapy.  
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Appendix A. Attachment Doll Story Completion Task (ASCT) 
 
Yönerge:  “Şimdi, nelerimiz var bir bakalım.” (Aile figürlerini çıkarın). “Bak bu 
bizim ailemiz. Bu annesi, bu babası, bu büyükannesi, bu da çocuk (Çocukla aynı 
cinsiyette olan oyuncağı gösterin). Hadi çocuğa isim verelim. Çocuğun ismi ne 
olsun istersin? Şimdi ailemizle ilgili bazı öyküler uydurup oynatacağız. Ben bu 
aile ile ilgili öyküler anlatmaya başlayacağım, sen de bu öykülerin sonunu 
anlatacaksın.” 
 
Doğum Günü Öyküsü (ısınma oyunu) 
Uygulayıcı: “Bu bir masa. Bakalım üzerinde ne varmış?” (Katılımcı pastayı görüp 
isimlendirene kadar beklenir.) “Bu ne pastası? Evet, bir doğum günü pastası. 
Şimdi öyküyü dikkatlice dinle. “Anne çok güzel bir doğum günü pastası yapmış. 
Şimdi de herkesi masaya çağırıyor.” 
 
(Anne figürü oynatılarak) Anne: “Büyükanne, baba, X (çocuğun verdiği isim). Hadi 
gelin. Doğum günü partisi yapalım. Hadi bakalım sen bu öykünün gerisini oynat.” 
 
1) Kazara Dökülen Meyve Suyu Öyküsü: 
 
Araçlar: Çocuk, anne, baba, masa, tabaklar 
Uygulayıcı: “Tamam, aklıma yeni bir hikaye geldi.” (Büyükanneyi alın ve yeni 
figürleri aşağıda gösterildiği gibi yerleştirin, masadan uzaklaştırın.) (İçinde sofra 
malzemelerinin olduğu kutuyu sallayın.) “Akşam yemeği için sofrayı hazırlamamda 
bana yardım eder misin?” (Kutu katılımcıya verilir, katılımcı sofrayı hazırlayana 
kadar beklenir, eğer yardım isterse yardımcı olunur.) “Şimdi aileyi yemek masasının 
etrafına oturtalım, böylece yemeğe hazır olsunlar.” (Katılımcı figürleri yerleştirene 
kadar beklenir.) “Burada ailemiz akşam yemeği yiyor. X ayağa kalktı, uzandı ve 
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meyve suyunu kazara devirdi.” (Çocuk figürünü meyve suyu kabını devirecek 
şekilde hareket ettirin, çocuğun kabı açıkça görmesini sağlayın.) 
Anne: “X, meyve suyunu döktün.” (Sitemli ama aşırıya kaçmayan bir ses tonuyla; 
anneyi X’e çevirin ve konuştuğu sırada hareket ettirin.) 
Uygulayıcı: “Şimdi ne olduğunu bana göster.” 
 
2) Yatak Odasındaki Canavar Öyküsü:  
 
Araçlar: Çocuk, anne, baba, üzerinde battaniyesi olan bir yatak 
Uygulayıcı: “Ailemizi yeni oyun için hazırlayabilir misin? “Şimdi neler olduğuna 
bak. Dikkatlice dinle.” 
Anne: (Annenin yüzü öyküdeki çocuğa çevrilir ve konuşurken hafifçe hareket 
ettirilir.) “Yatma vakti. Hadi bakalım, odana git ve uyu.” 
Baba: (Yüzü çocuğa dönerek, bir parça hareket verip ve sesi kalınlaştırarak) 
“Şimdi yatağına git”  
Çocuk: “Tamam anne baba gidiyorum.” (Çocuk figürünü yatağa doğru yürütün.) 
Uygulayıcı: “X üst kattaki odasına gidiyor, gidiyor.” 
Çocuk: (Korkmuş bir ses tonuyla) “Anne! Baba! Odamda bir canavar var! Odamda 
canavar var!  
Uygulayıcı: “Şimdi ne olduğunu bana göster.” 
 
3) Yaralı Diz Öyküsü: 
 
Araçlar: Çocuk, anne, baba, kayalık için sünger, çimen için keçe 
Uygulayıcı: “Tamam, Şimdi başka bir öyküm var. Ben bunları toplarken, sen 
ailemizi oraya koy ve yeni öykü için hazırla. Bak şimdi elimde neler var! (Bir parça 
yeşil alan ve kayalık yerleştirilir.) Bu bir park. Bunlar bizim ailemiz, parkta 
dolaşmaya çıkmışlar ve bu parkta yüksek, oldukça yüksek bir kayalık var.” 
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Çocuk: “Anne,  baba bakın. Bu yüksek, çok yüksek kayalığa nasıl da tırmandığımı 
seyredin.”  (Çocuk figürünü kayalığa tırmandırılmaya başlanır, daha sonra düşer.) 
“Off! Dizim acıyor.” (Ağlamaklı bir sesle) 
Uygulayıcı: “Şimdi ne olduğunu bana göster.” 
 
4) Ayrılık Öyküsü: 
 
Araçlar: Çocuk, anne, baba, büyükanne, çimen ve araba için bir kutu 
Uygulayıcı: “Hadi bu sefer büyükanneyi kullanalım.” (Yeşil alan ve arabayla 
birlikte, aile ve büyükanneyi masaya aşağıdaki gibi yerleştirilir. Arabanın 
katılımcının önünde olması ve her iki ebeveynin çocuklara ve büyükanneye bakıyor 
olası önemlidir.) “Burası onların ön bahçesi ve bu onların arabası. Bu ailenin 
arabası.” (Araba katılımcının önünde durduğu sırada anne ve babanın yüzlerini 
çocuk ve büyükanneye çevrilir.) “Sanırım, anne ve baba tatile gidiyorlar.” 
Anne: (Anne hafifçe hareket ettirilerek çocukla konuşturulur.) “Evet, X. Baban ve 
ben bir tatile gidiyoruz. Şimdi senden ayrılıp, tatile çıkıyoruz.”  
Baba: (Baba hafifçe hareket ettirilerek çocukla konuşturulur.) “Bir hafta sonra 
görüşürüz. Büyükannen seninle kalacak.”  
Uygulayıcı: “Şimdi ne olduğunu bana göster.” 
 
5) Yeniden Bir Araya Gelme Öyküsü: 
 
Araçlar: Çocuk, anne, baba, büyükanne, çimen ve araba için bir kutu 
Uygulayıcı: “Tamam, Ne oldu biliyor musun? Bir hafta geçti ve büyükanne 
pencereden dışarı bakıyor.” (Büyükannenin yüzü arabaya doğru çevrilir ve 
konuşurken biraz hareket ettirilir.) 
Büyükanne: “Bak X, annen ve baban geri geldi. Tatilden eve geri döndüler.”  
Uygulayıcı: “Şimdi ne olduğunu bana göster.” (Katılımcının arabayı eve 
yaklaştırmasına izin verilir ve gerekiyorsa yardımcı olunur. 
